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Abstract. The critical assessment of the legacy of socialist jurisprudence is amongst one of the most difficult tasks 
of the post-transitory Central-European legal thinking. This study provides a critical reading of the findings of 
Hungarian socialist legal sociology with respect to the description and analysis of the socialist legal culture. The 
discussion starts with the first comprehensive empirical survey on the legal knowledge of the population, designed 
and carried out by Kálmán Kulcsár in 1965 and ends with András Sajó’s synthesis on the nature of the Hungarian 
socialist legal culture elaborated in his monograph entitled Illusion and Reality in Law, published in 1986. The 
paper’s main conclusion is that this two decades long ‘golden age’ of Hungarian legal sociology offers many valid 
points in both methodological and substantive terms contrary to the fact that the various findings were mainly 
elaborated under the pressure of official Marxism-Leninism.
Keywords: sociology of the law, legal sociology, knowledge and opinion about law, Hungarian legal scholarship, 
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1. INTRODUCTION
The problems of legal consciousness,1 legal culture from a contemporary aspect, constituted 
the first and most important research theme studied by sociological methods during the four 
decades of the socialist jurisprudence in Hungary.2 This was the first research project of the 
Hungarian legal sociology in the early 1960s,3 and continued in several waves until the fall 
of the Socialist regime. Imre Szabó and Kálmán Kulcsár,4 the prominent figures of the 
      *   Research fellow MTA–TK–JTI Budapest, senior lecturer ELTE–ÁJK Budapest. E-mail: 
Fekete.Balazs@tk.mta.hu. The original research was carried out in the frame of the OTKA research 
program, the legal culture of the Hungarian population – conceptual and empirical research [OTKA 
105552]), while the publication of this paper supported by the programme of the Ministry of Justice 
for improving legal education in Hungary. The authors thank Masayuki Muriyama for his valuable 
comments on the earlier draft of this paper. A Hungarian version of this study was published in 2014: 
Fekete and H. Szilágyi (2014).
     **   Associate professor PPKE–JÁK, Budapest. E-mail: h.szilagyi.istvan@jak.ppke.hu 
1 The research area on which this study focuses has been named by the abbreviation KOL 
inspired by the title of Podgórecki and his colleagues’ famous volume, Knowledge and Opinion about 
Law. The study summarizing the results of the survey conducted in the 1960s by the members of the 
research group was published in 1973 and the expression has been used ever since to refer to research 
dealing with legal consciousness (KOL-research), and it is still one of the most cited basic studies of 
the topic. Cf. Podgórecki et al. (1973). For a critical survey of KOL research see Bankowski-
Mungham (1976) 19–22., Tomasic (1987) 116–18. 
2 The Communist takeover of legal academia occurred in 1949. Gyula Moór was forced to retire 
by 31 December 1948, and the practically unknown Imre Szabó was appointed as chair of the 
Department of Political and Legal Theory of the Law Faculty of ELTE. This was the final impetus for 
the internationally well-known Barna Horváth, considered to be the suitable successor of Moór, to 
leave the country. Cf. Szabadfalvi (1995) 150–51., H. Szilágyi (1995) 214.
3 For a critical analysis of this process see Fleck (2004).
4 For Kulcsár’s career starting years see Varga (2013).
327KNOWLEDGE AND OPINION ABOUT LAW (KOL) RESEARCH IN SOCIALIST HUNGARY
socialist jurisprudence both rejected the ‘bourgeois jurisprudence’ in the spirit of breaking 
with the past. Their ambivalent attitude manifested in this relation would have been better 
characterised, borrowing from the Marxian phraseology, by ‘eliminating preservation’. 
They in fact drew inventions from the earlier Hungarian traditions as well as from the 
contemporary ‘bourgeois jurisprudence’.
Imre Szabó, who ensured the ideological background for KOL studies, whose 
ambivalence can be observed by his heavy criticism of his predecessors, especially Julius 
Moór and Barna Horváth, whilst he kept their ideas on the necessity of cultivating social 
sciences on an international level.5 After his appointment as the head of the Institute for 
Legal Studies of Hungarian Academy of Sciences (ILS) in 1955, Szabó continuously sought 
the possibilities of maintaining the international relationships of the Hungarian jurisprudence 
within the confined ideological frames.
The role of Barna Horváth is worth paying attention to, particularly in connection with 
Kulcsár, because Horváth had already studied the sociology of public opinion from the late 
1930s.6 He had made a survey on the possible personality traits of future lawyers among the 
law students at the University of Szeged in the beginning of the 1940s.7 This research was 
undoubtedly related to the problems of legal consciousness.
Kulcsár had been certainly inspired also by the tradition of ethnographic study of 
Hungarian folkways, the second period which had started in 1938 with the initiative of 
Miklós Hofer and István Győrfi and in which Kulcsár himself took part along with Ernő 
Tárkány Szűcs and György Bónis.8
The ‘Polish connection’ had great importance regarding the impact of the contemporary 
Western jurisprudence, from the perspective of the Hungarian research. This meant that 
Kulcsár managed to integrate the Hungarian studies into an international network in which 
a researcher of a socialist country, Adam Podgórecki, professor of the University of Krakow, 
also participated with Western-European scholars. These international relations legitimized 
and helped to get the current findings of Western legal sociology and their Hungarian 
reception.9
Basic limitations should be kept in mind which arose from the socialist system. This 
paper will not emphasise the relatively well known ideological factors or those of the 
sociology of sciences. The strained circumstances were embedded in the observed social 
reality itself and stemmed from the fact that the Hungarian society was in a more or less 
subdued situation throughout the whole era. It was enforced into the frames of an artificially 
reduced and impoverished social structure and into a manipulated, one-way, ‘short-circuit’ 
system of communication. These problems will be readdressed in the review of the studies.
5 Imre Szabó carried out his legal studies at the Charles University in Prague in the middle of 
the 1930s, where he had the chance to participate at Hans Kelsen’s lectures. While in a 1946 review 
he praised one of Moór’s late works, in his 1955 opus magnum he discredited Moór as the ʻofficial 
legal scholar of the Horthy-era.’ Szabó’s unquestionable authority acquired during the socialist era is 
shown by the fact that he was able to re-publish his work written in 1955 in 1980 as well. Cf. Szabó 
(1946), Szabó (1955). For the best summary of the subject see: Szabadfalvi (2004), Szabadfalvi 
(2003), Varga (2006).
6 See: Horváth (1939), Horváth (1942), Horváth (1946). 
7 See: Horváth (1942).
8 About Kulcsár’s ambivalent relation to the ethnographic study on Hungarian folkways see H. 
Szilágyi (2002).
9 Cf. Podgórecki et al. (1973).
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2. THE FIRST HUNGARIAN COUNTRYWIDE REPRESENTATIVE SURVEY  
OF LEGAL KNOWLEDGE
Kálmán Kulcsár, having theoretically grounded the academic status of legal sociology in 
Hungary10 and with the agreement of Imre Szabó, started countrywide empirical research. 
The aim was to map the legal knowledge of the Hungarian population that, beyond the 
simple acquisition of information, touched upon several aspects of the essence of socialist 
law, e.g., to what extent the new, ‘people’s democratic laws’ were successful or what type 
of the new legislation could not reach the population.
The questionnaire was designed by Kulcsár whilst the interviews were conducted by 
law students from Budapest, Pécs and Szeged in 1965. The final report, with the outcomes 
were summarized in charts with Kulcsár’s foreword, was published by the ILS in 1967.11
2.1. The sample
Initially, the sample was defined as n=1200, but 1217 questionnaires were processed by the 
end of the research. According to the original plan, the legal knowledge of inhabitants of 
Budapest, other cities and of villagers should have been examined respectively in numbers 
of 650, 430 and 120, and these figures were to be subdivided further with respect to 
occupational groups and age. These proportions slightly changed in the course of the 
research and 563 questionnaires were filled out in Budapest, 402 in other cities and 252 by 
villagers. Kulcsár explained these deviations due the numbers of the villagers had had to be 
raised because of a cancelled research program and several questionnaires had not been 
assessable.12
It is worth mentioning Kulcsár’s statements about the qualitative characteristics of the 
sample as it is not representative in regard to the whole population of the country. In his 
opinion, this would not be necessary to accomplish for the purpose of the research partly 
because the examination of legal knowledge, as a manifestation of the social consciousness, 
does not require the same exactness as the examination of other ‘hard’ social facts, e.g., the 
case of demography.13 Here the partial application of the mathematical rules of sampling is 
enough for grounding general conclusions. Furthermore, the aim of the research is not the 
overall description of the legal knowledge in Hungary but the demonstration and evaluation 
of the differences occurring among the examined social groups.14
There were several other characteristics of the sample further diminishing its 
representativeness. The sample involves only the jobholders. The respondents are divided 
10 In the foreword of his pioneer work of the era called A jogszociológia problémái (The 
problems of legal sociology) Kulcsár argues in favour of dealing with legal sociology in socialist 
jurisprudence because criticising bourgeois legal sociology is a necessity, especially for the sake of 
conducting Marxist sociology of a ʻproductive nature’ ; legal sociology has affected Marxist legal 
thinking as well and legal sociology, besides satisfying theoretical interests, is also important for 
practicing lawyers. Kulcsár (1960) 3–6. After publishing this volume Kulcsár reviewed several 
foreign articles in study-length writings, this way informing the Hungarian scientific public about the 
most recent results of legal sociology, e.g., Kulcsár (1962) (on Glendon A. Schubert: Quantitative 
Analysis of Judicial Behavior. Illinois, Glencoe, 1959.), Kulcsár (1964) (on W. M. Ewan (ed.): Law 
and Sociology. Glencoe, 1962.).
11 Kulcsár (1967). 
12 Kulcsár (1967) 13–14.
13 Kulcsár (1967) 11.
14 Kulcsár (1967) 12.
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into three occupational strata: intellectuals, labourers and agricultural labourers. Kulcsár 
dismisses the idea of further sample divisions highlighting that its small number statistically 
makes it impossible.15 The sampling was also limited in geographical terms. Focusing only 
on three cities (Budapest, Pécs, Szeged) and four villages (Balástya, Görcsöny, Pécsudvard, 
Pusztaszer) as the researchers thought that this would correctly represent the settlement 
structure of the country. Moreover, it was necessary to raise the number of the villagers in 
the sample over their real proportion in the population, otherwise nearly all respondents 
would have been chosen from Budapest, because of the small number of the sample.
2.2. The research postulates
The presentation of Kulcsár’s assumptions can show the important structural elements 
of the theoretical framework in which the research was done. Re-uniting these elements, 
a picture of the notions and suppositions with which the empirical findings were examined 
in the socialist jurisprudence of the 1960s can be created.16
The theoretical starting point of the research is a truism today but it certainly was not 
in the heyday of ‘socialist normativism’.17 Both its content and implications were quite far 
from the official view as Kulcsár thought it was evident that the general awareness of the 
promulgated legal rules was a sheer fiction – the legal formulation and promulgation of a 
rule does not guarantee that it will reach the addressed people or, frequently, the society as 
a whole.18 Consequently, the research of legal knowledge is an indispensable scientific task.
The knowledge of law cannot be approached in a simplistic manner but should be 
examined in the most differentiated and sophisticated way. This idea is discernible through 
the whole project – Kulcsár distinguishes the ‘layers’ of legal knowledge from various 
points of view. For example, he creates a distinction between the knowledge of general and 
specific social strata, as well as, among the levels of knowledge of various branches of law 
and even of specific legal rules. He is continuously trying to synoptically look at the social 
and legal dimensions of the findings, as, in Kulcsár’s eyes, only the comparison of these 
aspects can provide scientifically assessable information.
Kulcsár legitimises the research by stating that the governance of the society through 
legal rules ‘requires the scientific inquiry of the knowledge of law’.19 He obviously tries to 
save legal sociology from the ideological suspicions, e.g., it is a ‘re-actionist’ field of study, 
or it is ‘functioning in such a way that weakens the official ideology’. He emphasises that 
the study of legal knowledge can contribute to the effective operation of the socialist 
system.
15 Kulcsár (1967) 12., 19.
16 At this point we have drawn inspiration from Oakshott’s research methodology on the history 
of ideas. According to Oakshott, in the periods where public affairs started to be effectively dealt with 
(politics), in every case a specific ʻdictionary’ characteristic of the period has also developed, which 
made conducting debates possible and marked the frames of political thinking. Nothing prevents the 
development of such dictionaries in certain periods of scientific world, in other different areas of 
science. Cf. Oakeshott (2006) 40–41. 
17 For an outstanding introduction and ideological critique of socialist normativism see: Szilágyi 
(2003). 
18 ‘The societal and state order, from the perspective of the security of law is naturally 
understood as a fiction, as it is apparent that proving the knowledge of law case by case would mean 
the failure of the application, the effect and functioning of law.’ Kulcsár (1967) 7. 
19 Kulcsár (1967) 7.
330 BALÁZS FEKETE, ISTVÁN H. SZILÁGYI
Kulcsár chooses the survey method because of the lack of objective data. Only the 
number and content of the breaches of the law could be regarded as such data but the 
motivational base of infringements is so wide that the role of the legal knowledge would 
not be scientifically identified in it, he claims. A relatively high number of the sample also 
excludes the use of the method of content analysis. Kulcsár is naturally aware of the fact 
that the success of the research heavily depends on the construction of the questionnaire 
hence the detailed descriptions.20
Kulcsár defines the concept of legal knowledge by delimiting it from legal 
consciousness. This distinction is important, as, by doing so, he has opened a theoretical 
room for the later studies of legal consciousness that gained a considerably support in the 
1970s. Legal consciousness is the more comprehensive notion that comprises the field of 
legal knowledge among other components and is basically the sum of ‘all the notions that 
people hold about the current laws’.21 He uses the concept of ‘everyday legal consciousness’ 
on purpose, although he does not reflect on it specifically. Legal knowledge is an element of 
legal consciousness; it is itself a print of the social knowledge of law specified by the social 
stratification and the structure of law, which, besides other social factors, contributes to the 
constant formation of legal consciousness.
Kulcsár applies yet another distinction when he defines the concept of legal knowledge. 
Attributing an important, but not conclusive, role to the informational processes that convey 
the contents of rules to the addressees, he distinguishes two aspects of legal knowledge: the 
informational processes themselves;22 and the outcomes of these processes.23 Today these 
are called the dynamic and static view of legal knowledge. The extension of the notion, so 
as to include the dynamic aspect, allows him to magnify the scope of the study to take the 
problems of legal communication into account.24
Several notes that Kulcsár makes in the course of detailing the construction of the 
questionnaire show that he has certain preconceptions about the factors forming legal 
knowledge. It seems for him, these factors are the respondent’s residence, gender, social 
position, occupation, participation in the work civil society organizations, reading legal 
rules, interaction with state organs and knowledge of politics. Kulcsár points out three 
groups of factors as the most important in the determination of legal knowledge: the 
respondent’s sociocultural position, the level of knowledge and personal experiences with 
the legal system.
The final point in the discussion of Kulcsár’s theoretical premises is that he could only 
rely upon a limited set of preliminary studies25 and he had no previous experience of 
conducting survey research.
In conclusion, it can be asserted that Kulcsár had a coherent and well elaborated 
conceptual view that stretched beyond the frames of the contemporary official Marxist 
jurisprudence in several aspects. The distinction between the knowledge of law and legal 
consciousness and the connection of the concept of legal knowledge to the informational 
processes were especially important premises. Kulcsár’s work became the theoretical 
starting points of the later studies grounding a viable research tradition.
20 Kulcsár (1967) 9–11.
21 Kulcsár (1967) 10.
22 Kulcsár (1967) 16., 32.
23 Kulcsár (1967) 10., 18–28.
24 Kulcsár (1967) 28–29.
25 He refers to two articles in particular: Studnicki (1965) and Kutchinsky (1966).
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2.3. Methodology
The research uses the well-known sociological method of scale calculation. The ideal level 
of legal knowledge, when all the respondents answer every question correctly, is 1 and the 
real level will show how far the number of the right answers approaches the ideal level. The 
actual level will always be less than 1.26 The actual level of knowledge is obtained by 
dividing the number of wrong answers by the number of all questions and subtracting the 
quotient from 1.
2.4. Outcomes
The final result of the scale calculation of legal knowledge was 0.55. This number in itself 
tells nothing about whether the level of legal knowledge can be regarded as high or low, 
this could be decided only after a multifaceted comparative analysis. It is important that the 
answers to the questions about the legal process itself were not included in the final result 
as Kulcsár left them out, asserting that they showed so great an alteration from the other 
data that it must have certainly been a random irregularity.27
Kulcsár thinks that the relationship between legal knowledge and consciousness can be 
demonstrated by the outcomes of the research. A picture can be drawn about legal 
consciousness if the answers given to the questions are examined that do not concern 
everyday life. If these answers, no matter whether they are right or wrong, show high level 
of accordance, i.e., not diverging with respect to the social stratification, then they will be 
manifestations of legal consciousness. The inquiry of legal knowledge could shed light on 
the various dimensions of legal consciousness, if the right questions are found.28
It is generally observable that the level of legal knowledge is the highest among the 
white collar workers and it gradually decreases among the physical workers and the 
agricultural physical workers.29 Thus, the assumed correlation between the social 
stratification and the level of legal knowledge is empirically verified. A similar correlation 
appears between the political and legal knowledge, although the level of the former is 
usually higher than the latter.
Taking a closer look at the various branches of law, Kulcsár points out that the highest 
level of concordance between the content of legal rules and legal consciousness can be 
found in the field of penal law. This is partly brought about by the moral embeddedness of 
criminal law and partly by the distinct attention of mass media directed to crimes.30 More 
divergences occur among the different social strata in the knowledge of civil law, 
nevertheless there are several areas where the answers are considerably congruent, e.g., the 
rules of loan, so the presence of legal consciousness is perceivable. Immediate practical 
experiences and belonging to certain professions can also exert a decisive influence on the 
knowledge of some legal problems.
Somewhat surprisingly the level of knowledge of constitutional and administrative law 
is the lowest in the 1960s’ Hungary. Kulcsár asserts that this fact is due to the ineffectiveness 
of the communicational channels, e.g., newspapers, education, ‘agitprop’ activities, and also 
calls attention to the problem that the average person cannot clearly see their position in 
26 Kulcsár (1967) 17.
27 Kulcsár (1967) 18.
28 Kulcsár (1967) 21.
29 See: Kulcsár (1967) 19. Table 6. 
30 Kulcsár (1967) 21. 
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relation to the state organs. In his opinion, this latter effect is rooted in both the ‘preliberation’ 
(1920–1945) period and in the era of ‘personality cult’ (1949–1956).31 This general picture 
is tinged with an interesting fact, namely that the villagers’ knowledge about the local state 
organs was exceptionally high. According to him, this is due to the living, face-to-face 
relationships between the council and the villagers that did not exist anymore in the greater 
communities (in the cities or the capital) in the 1960s.32
The results clearly show that men’s level of legal knowledge is higher than women’s 
and women’s political knowledge is also lower. It means that gender and gender related 
social roles influence the level of legal knowledge.33 It is no wonder that the highest 
difference between the levels of legal knowledge of the genders occurs in the field of 
constitutional law, especially if it is taken into account that women’s political representation 
was rather low in the time of socialism.34 The geographic differences show that the lowest 
level of legal knowledge appears in the villages. Kulcsár emphasises that the villagers are 
disadvantaged in the access to legal information partly because they are relatively 
unschooled and partly due to their general cultural conditions.35 Finally, another somewhat 
surprising result is that age does not affect considerably the level of legal knowledge.36
Regarding the dynamics of legal informational processes, it is interesting that three 
quarter of the respondents had read legal texts, according to the results and it seems that 
reading law is a decisive factor in the knowledge of administrative law. Reading newspapers 
has a similar impact, albeit it improves legal knowledge in a more general way, because the 
vast bulk of legal information comes from court reports and journalism.37 Interpersonal 
relations also have an effect on legal knowledge as working in civil society organizations 
influences the level of knowledge and it can be practically seen as an informal channel of 
legal information. Among the institutional factors, the influence of the personnel (judges, 
jurors, lawyers) of the judicature has an outstanding effect disseminating relevant 
information to the laics, so the system of judicature also functions as an informational 
channel.
3. THE QUEST FOR A THEORETICAL MODEL OF LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS 
IN EMPIRICAL RESEARCHES
Kulcsár left the ILS in 1969 when he was appointed as the head of the Institute of Sociology 
(IS). Afterwards, András Sajó, who started his career in the ILS in 1972, immediately after 
his university studies, became the key figure of the KOL studies in the next two decades. 
The ILS and the IS provided the institutional background for the second wave of the KOL-
studies, which began in the early 70s and were financed from the ‘social consciousness 
studies’ research fund. From a sociological point of view, the greatest achievement in this 
era was that the focus of studies moved from the relatively unproblematic theme of legal 
31 Kulcsár (1967) 23–24.
32 Kulcsár (1967) 25.
33 At this point Kulcsár honestly talks about the relation between the existing social inequality 
of women and the lack of legal knowledge. Kulcsár (1967) 26.
34 For a detailed assessment of the societal roles fulfilled by women in the times of socialism 
see: Tóth (2010). 
35 Kulcsár (1967) 27–28.
36 Kulcsár (1967) 27.
37 Kulcsár (1967) 29–30.
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knowledge to the more sensitive topic of the inquiry of social morals and values of legal 
consciousness. This ‘break-through’ widened the scope of the research and made 
methodological experiments possible. It gradually distanced legal sociology from the 
Marxist legal theory which had become dogmatic and rigorous. These changes prepared the 
ground for Sajó’s synthesis, Illusion and Reality in Law, which published in the mid 1980s, 
several years before the democracy. In this work, he criticized the socialist ‘rule of law’ and 
jurisprudence with an outsider’s sour irony and shed light on the alarming symptoms of the 
Hungarian society’s moral decline.
3.1. The main trends of KOL studies in the 1970s
One of the most important themes of the KOL studies was the examination of the ideas 
about criminal law as the criminological studies naturally joined legal sociology in this 
field. Some examples, in chronological order, were the audience poll of the Blue Light 
television programme (1973);38 the social strata surveys containing questions about penal 
law (1975,39 1977,40 197941); the studies on the assessment of criminal law (1976–1977);42 
the inquiries of criminal law’s value system (1978)43 and of the problems of victimisation 
(1982).44
Lots of research investigated how civil and family law was functioning, which was 
also of major importance for the inquiries of legal consciousness. Thus the examination of 
the sociological aspects of civil law litigation (1976);45 the evaluation of family law (1976–
1977),46 and of the opinion on civil law (1983) can be mentioned.
Considerably less attention was devoted to administrative law (then ‘law of state 
administration’) and to constitutional law. There were already some questions were raised 
on labour law, what the socialist jurisprudence classified as a branch of the ‘mixed special 
laws’ containing elements of public law, in the Kulcsár-research and also in the later strata 
inquiries. However, these were concerned not so much with the legal consciousness but 
rather with the legal knowledge of labour law regulations. Looking back, this problem is 
easily explainable regarding the political and sociological conditions of the time. In the 
course of the 1975–76 strata surveys, the scholars tried to solve this problem by introducing 
the descriptive category of ‘respect of state’ in the research.47
The research themes were not exclusively shaped by the science-sociological factors 
but partly by the earlier findings and the issues of theoretical grounding. For example, it had 
38 Dankánics and Erdősi (1974) VI. 8.
39 The legal consciousness of physical workers, 1975; control survey 1976. See: Sajó (1975b), 
Sajó, Székelyi and Major (1977). 
40 The legal consciousness of economic leaders, 1977. See Sajó (1981a).
41 The legal- and value consciousness of caretakers – control group for the survey on the legal 
consciousness of physical workers, 1979. See: Sajó (1981b). 
42 The evaluation of family- and criminal law, 1976–1977. For the results regarding criminal 
law see: Boros and Sajó (1983) 129–330. (Sajó’s analysis).
43 The value system of criminal law, 1978. See: Vígh and Tauber (1983) 64–111.
44 The problem of victimisation, 1982. See: Korinek (1984); Korinek (1985); Korinek (1991). 
45 The sociological aspects of civil law litigation, 1976. See: Kulcsár (1982) 203–29.
46 The evaluation of family- and criminal law, 1976–1977. For the results of the family law 
study see: Boros and Sajó (1983) 5–126.
47 Sajó, Székelyi and Major (1977) 86–88. About the notion of ʻrespect of stateʼ see below 
section 3.3.
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been established in the previous legal knowledge studies that lay people knew hardly 
anything about that fields of law that were encountered very rarely in everyday life, 
especially procedural laws. On the other hand, due to the demand for a theoretical 
framework, the researchers tried to expand the scope of studies to be able to involve all the 
different fields of law and to discover the various factors influencing legal consciousness. 
For instance, scholars examined such factors as social stratification;48 belonging to a certain 
social group;49 legal communication;50 legal socialization;51 and legal profession52 – all 
thought to influence legal consciousness.
3.2. Methodological starting points and endeavours in theory construction
There was no representative survey made regarding research methods following the 
comprehensive Kulcsár-research,53 although practically all the other statistical and social 
psychological methods were applied in the strata and social group studies. The methods of 
interview and document analysis were used along with the survey method. It can be 
concluded that, retrospectively, the methodological professionalism hardly seems to be 
questionable, apart from some uncertainties.54
One aspect of the theoretical grounding was the specification of the relations of these 
researches to Marxism, more closely to the Marxist jurisprudence. This would have required 
the establishment of a medium level sociological theory. Most of the studies dealt with 
social psychological problems and probably an interactionist theory could have been the 
right choice, which should have been connected to Marxist ‘social theory’ or jurisprudence. 
In strict scientific sense, this task was unsolvable, even incomprehensible.55 Fortunately 
Imre Szabó cut the ‘Gordian knot’ in Foundations of Marxist Jurisprudence, published in 
1971. He devoted a whole chapter to the questions of legal consciousness from an 
emphatically Marxist perspective56 and with this work, Szabó legitimised the KOL studies 
and simultaneously identified and canonised the set of topics for the next generation of 
socialist jurisprudence to apply and later vary.57
Sajó, however, could not continue in the same vein as it took almost two third of 
Respecting Law and Social Behaviour,58 published nearly a decade later in 1980, to retread 
the path laid by Szabó. This was done to refresh the worn down phraseology and drawing 
48 See Sajó (1975b), Sajó, Székelyi and Major (1977). 
49 See Sajó (1981a); Sajó (1981b). 
50 Besides Dankánics-Erdősi (1974), Neményi-Sajó (1984).
51 The problem of legal socialization. Survey conducted among four graders of ten secondary 
schools in Budapest and Pécs, and their parents and teachers (1982). Léderer and Sajó (1984).
52 Besides Léderer and Sajó (1984) see: the study of the legal consciousness of university 
students in Pécs (1985). Visegrády and Schadt (1985).
53 Although from reconstructing references it seems that the 1983 survey examining the opinion 
on civil law was representative to the whole population, these data were only partially used later.
54 Such as the practice that Sajó (in the study mentioned in footnote 40.) merged the concepts of 
working groups and groups (from a sociological understanding), disregarding the fact that there was 
no interpersonal communication between the caretakers participating in the survey.
55 If we take into account the fact that Marxism was never a ʻsocial theory’, nor a science. In the 
Hungarian literature on legal theory see: H. Szilágyi (2003), H. Szilágyi (2004). 
56 Szabó (1971) 197–300. 
57 Just to mention a few relevant studies: Tamás (1969), Horváth (1969), Samu (1975). 
58 Sajó (1980).
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inventions from George Lukács’s ontology, as a reverberation of the ‘renaissance that failed 
to come’, using Tibor Hanák’s words.59
Sajó himself was aware of the grotesqueness of the situation and this can be shown by 
quoting a phrase from a note added after a long Lukács citation ‘We ought to beg the 
reader’s pardon for these, maybe slightly scholastic references to authority and annotations 
but it could be decisive – before an unbiased court – that, contrary to the well-known 
behaviour-oriented concept of law, the outcome of the Marxist ontological approach is the 
same as that of the sociological one.’60
Other researchers, who might have had less theoretical aptitude, solved the problem of 
the ‘legal theoretical connection’ of Marxist theory to sociology by applying the method of 
the ‘red corner’, generally used in the scientific world of the socialist era. A typical example 
of this is the study of József Vígh and István Tauber from 1978. The foreword of this study 
says ‘These studies are all built on the Marxist thought that it is not people’s consciousness 
that determines their existence but the other way around, it is social existence that creates 
and shapes people’s consciousness.’ [Highlights from the original text are neglected here.]61 
This work then continued with more Marxist clichés for two paragraphs, emphasising that 
they follow the ʻred path’ laid down by Szabó. This is followed by purely intelligent, 
hardcore sociology, which has nothing to do with the thoughts expressed in the foreword.
The first phase of theory construction, the sociological grounding, has Sajó as the most 
prominent figure with a number of works, for instance: ‘Legal Concepts in the Individual 
Mind’ published in 1976;62 the second part of his treatise, published in 1980, titled 
‘Individual Conscious Respect of Law’,63 and the seventh chapter of his volume published 
in 1986, titled ‘Worlds of Beliefs – Outside the Door of Law’, in which the results of his 
research are summarized.64 It seems proper to connect the more detailed account of these 
studies to the chronological survey of the empirical research to clarify the tendencies in 
theory construction.
3.3. The 1970s – focusing on the social group and on the respect of law
In 1973, a public opinion survey inquired about the evaluation of Blue Light,65 a popular 
television programme and its influence on the respondents.66 1724 people were surveyed by 
59 See: Hanák (1979).
60 Sajó (1980) 54.
61 Vígh and Tauber (1983) 65. After this, they continue with more Marxist clichés for two 
paragraphs, emphasising that they follow the ʻred path’ laid down by Szabó. This is followed by 
purely intelligent, ʻhardcore’ sociology, which has nothing to do with the thoughts expressed in the 
foreword.
62 Sajó (1976). 
63 Sajó (1980) 197–327.
64 Sajó (1986) 273–312.
65 The original purpose of the TV show, first broadcasted monthly, then every other week in the 
1980s, was to inform the population about the work of law enforcement authorities – especially the 
police – and the most significant criminal cases. In the first part of the show the host discussed the 
general situation or major tendencies of crime with high-ranking state officials and the second part 
followed with news about different crime investigations, usually murder or other severe crimes. 
Sometimes this discussion involved interviews with the perpetrators. At the end of the show, the help 
of the audience was requested in ongoing investigations and/or in finding missing or wanted people.
66 Dankánics and Erdősi (1974).
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mailed questionnaires. However, this sample was not wholly representative because there 
was no television in some households at the time of the research.
The outcome of the research contributed to the better understanding of the structure of 
legal consciousness by corroborating the connection between anxiety and demand for 
punishment, which had already been presupposed in social psychology and legal sociology. 
Half of the viewers felt anxiety during the interviews made with criminals and this 
experience inspired hate against the perpetrators in more than sixty percent of viewers. 
Two third of the questioned viewers did not consider it important to respect the constitutional 
rights of the accused.
The study shed light on the influence of mass media on legal consciousness. The 
anxiety induced by the interviews with criminals, which were concentrating on the 
perpetrators’ personality and on the detailed description on how they committed the crimes, 
overshadowed the effects of the news announced in the first part of the programme that 
usually emphasized the stability of public order and the efficiency of law enforcement. Less 
than one quarter of the respondents thought that the number of crimes had not been rising 
whilst 44% felt the situation worsened –in reality the number did not rise at all. At the same 
time, the program enhanced the viewers’ inclination to stigmatise and shaped stereotypes, 
strengthening prejudices.67 The study, concerning the differentiated structure of legal 
consciousness, substantiated that the procedural rules of penal law were mostly unknown to 
the majority of viewers but they roughly knew the material rules of the penal law.
The main study of this decade was the survey of the legal consciousness of physical 
workers, conducted in 1975 and controlled in 1976.68 The aim of the research was to study 
three theoretical problems in an integrated way: How the social structure affects the 
individual legal consciousness; what psychological and social psychological factors 
contribute to the formation of individual legal consciousness and how the scope of Kulcsár’s 
inquiries on the knowledge of law can be expanded. The theoretical clarification of the 
concept of legal consciousness was needed to be able to align this threefold problematic 
and to make it operational it for empirical study. This was accomplished by Sajó in the 
above mentioned essay published in 1976.69 The most important theses of the essay are 
enumerated below as follows:70
A distinction has to be drawn between the levels of social and individual legal 
consciousness. The former appears in the form of culture, folkways or in the public opinion. 
It has an external effect on the individual consciousness, albeit the existence of mutual 
influence between them is also evident. Social ideas, legal culture, legal folkways, about 
law are relatively well definable but the notions of individual mind reflecting on law are 
diffuse and inconsistent – regularity and logical consistency, the most important traits of the 
law as social objectification, are far from being characteristic of the individual legal 
consciousness. The psychological basis of the diffusion of legal notions in the individual 
mind is the lack of a ‘personality function’ corresponding to law.71
67 Later, in the 1980s, Kék Fény largely contributed to the emergence of the notion of ‘Roma 
crimes’ and also their spreading among the population.
68 See: Sajó (1975b); Sajó, Székelyi and Major (1977).
69 Sajó (1976).
70 The original Marxist phrases and expressions are not used when reconstructing this line of 
thought.
71 At this point Sajó sharply criticises the view of Podgórecki and the Polish legal sociological 
school tracing back to Petrazycki, according to which there is a certain feeling of law or a sense of 
justice in individual legal consciousness that could be seen as a basis for an attitude referring to law. 
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The social structure connects and pervades the social and the individual legal 
consciousness. The social position of the individual conclusively determines the intellectual 
and material conditions, which shape the individual’s notions about law. The most 
prominent conditions among these are the cognitive, e.g. religious morals, class-
consciousness, professional ethos, various subcultures, and the emotional factors of 
belonging to certain groups i.e., the desire for self-identification with the community.
The external manifestation of the individual legal consciousness is the opinion about 
law, though this can be only indirectly related to the evaluation of law and the actual 
individual behaviour can be seen even less as a straightforward consequence. The formation 
and disclosure of an opinion is an action itself with which the individual takes part in the 
communication in her narrower or wider social environment. However, this communication 
has its own psychical laws that can influence or ‘distort’ the formation of individual opinion. 
In this respect, the influence of the mass media is of great importance. The ‘respect of law’ 
appearing in the sociological inquiries about the general evaluation of law is, from the 
individual’s perspective, nothing but the acceptance of the authority of the law-maker and 
the law enforcing state organs. This means that the study of the background political factors 
is also needed, along with the introduction of the ‘respect of state’ as an autonomous 
category besides the ‘respect of law’.
Regarding the cognitive element of legal consciousness, knowledge of law does not 
conform in its structure to the law but shows the same diffusion as the legal concepts in the 
individual mind. The determining ‘hard facts’ of the individual’s social position, gender, 
age, education, occupation, are conclusive for the level of legal knowledge. Besides these, 
belonging to social groups and individual experiences also affect the knowledge of law. 
However, the level of legal knowledge does not show a strong correlation with the measure 
of respect of law.
The empirical study72 surveyed 301 physical, skilled and unskilled, workers from 
Budapest and 136 agricultural physical workers in the basic sample of the 1975 survey. The 
sample was divided into 12 groups by age, gender and education for the comparative strata 
inquiries.73 The questionnaires were filled out by interviewers in the course of guided 
conversations. 50 law students were questioned in the autumn of 1975 and 40 skilled 
workers were re-questioned in the summer of 1976 for the control survey. The important 
sociological characteristics of the basic sample showed the effects of both the forced 
industrialization and the socialist ‘rural development’. A significant percentage of the 
workers from Budapest were born in the countryside – they were first generation city-
inhabitants. Moving into the capital was a more important reason for the mobility than 
preserving the former social status, e.g., 40% of the unskilled female workers found 
themselves in a lower status than their parents. The majority (87%) of the respondents were 
married with the spouse’s social status was generally equal or lower than that of the 
respondent – this factor diminished the heterogeneity of origin. Regarding socialization, the 
72 Sajó, Székelyi and Major (1977).
73 In the grouping by age they have distinguished between two groups: the ‘old’ (born between 
1920–24) and the ‘young’ (1935–1939). This was important because the socialization of the ‘old’ 
group took place before and during the war, while that of the ‘young’ ones happened in the socialist 
era. In the category of profession (which partially involved education as well) they differentiated 
between unskilled, skilled and agricultural physical workers.
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characteristic method of parenting was the main way that usually leads to the formation of 
an ‘authoritarian personality’, borrowing the social psychology term.74
The researchers examined the effects exerted by legal experiences on legal 
consciousness at two different levels. At the societal level, they studied how those positive 
and negative historical events that were considered paramount in the given social stratus’ 
view, e.g., socialist takeover, land reform, surrender of goods, show trials, had been 
interpreted in legal consciousness and the influence of the immediate experiences on legal 
consciousness was analysed at the individual level.
The researchers concluded that, regarding the influence of social experiences, the 
actual experiences ‘rewrote’ the past and these have primary importance as compared to the 
public opinion about the historical events. However, this statement could probably be 
reversed, if it is considered that while the injustice of the system of compulsory surrender 
of goods, no longer a taboo in the 1970s, after the consolidation of the Kádár-system, was 
remembered by 95% of agricultural workers whilst only 8% of the respondents remembered 
(or had the courage to remember) the show trials related to the 1956 revolution, which had 
been banished into the unconscious of the public thinking.
In the course of the investigation of individual legal experiences, the researchers 
separately looked into the effects induced by the experiences of contact with the courts and 
with the administrative state organs. At the end, they concluded that the effects of the 
experiences acquired in the courts outweighed the influence of contact with the 
administrative organs.75 The respondents often did not regard the latter as of legal quality, 
they did not have such clear memories and the evaluation of this kind of experience largely 
depended on whether the decision delivered by the state organ had been positive or negative.
The most interesting observation made during the study of the individual experiences, 
was the exploration of the individual’s schizophrenic relation to law. While the respondents 
accepted the law at the ‘official’ level, when it came to their individual actions, individuals 
tended to evade it, keeping only their own interests in mind and repeatedly referring to 
fairness, as if they had been saying ‘The law is right and it must be rigorously observed by 
everyone, except me.’76
74 90% of the people present in the sample talked about experience coming from religious 
nurture, besides the generally applied physical abuse (even if it was only a slap in the face in 59% of 
the sample). The latter fact closely correlated with the harmonious or inharmonious nature of family 
life. 
75 This was the case despite the fact that 45% of the sample had never been to a court. However, 
at the same time,. Only 16% of the polled had found the court’s ruling unjust, moreover within 
this group a majority thought that only a factual mistake could have caused the negative decision, 
shows the authority of the courts. However, it is somehow puzzling that 41% of the young unskilled 
workers coming from Budapest has attended court in relation to a crime case, even if most of them 
was present not as a defendant but as a witness. This shows the morally degrading effect of the forced 
industrialization and the loss of traditional community bonds due to an artificial social mobilization 
coming along with it.
76 ‘We could see that even those people consider the court’s ruling just whose interests are 
violated by the decision; the violation of interest rather results in helpless complaints. The concept of 
righteousness in light of this experience is divided even in the consciousness of individuals: on the 
one hand, if they evaluate the ruling as just (or lawful, or true, which is a prerequisite), they accept it 
due to its lawfulness, which does not prevent them from desiring another solution based on fairness. 
Instead of the synthesising nature of righteousness, in these divided consciousnesses the societal 
generality of lawfulness and the particularity of the morality of private interest coexists, and it does so 
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The most important part of the study from a methodological point of view was the 
investigation of the respect of law. The researchers worked out a special method which, 
took the psychological mechanism of projection into account and made it possible to 
measure the respondents’ legal knowledge and to characterise their legal consciousness 
from the aspects of tolerance and conformity at the same time. Bearing the outcomes of the 
earlier surveys on legal knowledge in mind, the researchers used facts of cases of penal law 
nature in the formulation of the questionnaire. The respondent was asked whether the law 
punished a given human act, which was followed by the question of whether this action 
should be punished by law in their opinion. On the basis of the answers, three factors could 
be compared: the actual legal regulation (A); the legal regulation presupposed by the 
respondent (B = ‘subjective indictability’) and its subjective evaluation (C).77 The level of 
legal knowledge could be ascertained by the comparison of the former two elements (A–B), 
while the respect of law could be assessed from the relation of the latter two (B–C). All this 
was completed by a categorization – ‘labelling’, ‘moral’ and ‘deliberating’78 – based on the 
content analysis of the responses, which aimed to show the motivations behind the respect 
of law. Taking these indicators into account, the sample could be characterised as follows.
The majority of respondents (56%) turned out to be conformist, with one third (31%) 
of the sample being non-conformist with the remaining 13% having no idea about the legal 
regulations. The vast majority (87%) of the conformists belonged to the category of 
intolerants. The motivations of two thirds (67%) of the conformist intolerants were 
‘labelling’, while 70% of the tolerant non-conformists were ‘deliberating’. The control 
peacefully.’ [Highlights in the original text] Sajó, Székelyi and Major (1977) 40. About the problem 
of the schizophrenic relation to law see below section 4.4.
77 Tolerant: the polled person does not consider the crime to be indictable. Intolerant: the 
responder considers the crime to be indictable. Conformist: the subjective evaluation matches the 
objective official indictability. Nonconformist: a subjective evaluation diverging from the objective 
official indictability. The answers can be divided into six groups based on these criteria:
 –  tolerant non-conformist: based on the assumed legal regulation the act is indictable, but the 
pollee would not do so.
 –  intolerant non-conformist: based on the assumed legal regulation the act is not indictable, 
but the pollee would do so.
 –  conformist intolerant: based on the assumed legal regulation the act is indictable and the 
pollee agrees.
 –  conformist tolerant: based on the assumed legal regulation the act is not indictable and the 
pollee agrees.
 –  tolerant: the pollee does not know what the law says about the crime, but she would not 
penalize the act.
 –  intolerant: the pollee does not know what the law says about the crime, but she would 
penalize the act.
78 Labelling: the questionee when justifying their answers saw the violation of an abstract, 
but not moral, obligation in the action, or simply labelled it, or validated the suggestive reaction, e.g. 
in relation to homosexuality: homosexuals are ‘dangerous’, they have to be ‘segregated’, It is 
‘unnatural’ etc.
 –  Moral: the responder mentions a certain moral motivation, e.g. homosexuality is immoral.
 –  Deliberating: the questionee did not refer to a general principle, but tried to take the 
circumstances of the case into consideration, to understand the motives of the perpetrator, 
or endorse a societal point of view, e.g. homosexuality is a ‘private matter’, ‘we cannot 
have a say in it if they do it discretely.’
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surveys on law students and security guards corroborated that the tolerance indicator was 
strata specific – independent from the individual character – and increased with the 
education.
The researchers tried to substantiate their thesis on the strata specific nature of the 
tolerance-indicator by investigating the respondents’ personality and tested the respondents’ 
personal frustration tolerance (PFT). Their primary hypothesis was that those who tolerated 
frustration better would also tolerate with deviancy, and their demand for punishment would 
be less assertive. The outcomes of the tests showed the contrary – those who proved to be 
the most intolerant of deviancy were the best in dealing with frustration.79 The results of the 
PFT tests did not show any significant relation with the different motives. All led to the 
conclusion that the degree of tolerance of deviancy did not depend on the individual 
personality. The personality could only play a role in the extent of the individual’s 
identification with the dominant ideas of their reference group.
In the course of the investigation of legal knowledge, the researchers extended the 
scope of the study to include three legal fields: penal law, private law and constitutional 
law. Penal law proved to be the best known to the respondents, in accordance with the 
previous expectations. In light of the outcomes, it seemed that the level of the knowledge of 
penal law was not influenced by education or gender.
The survey concentrated on family law and law of inheritance within private law, 
as the researchers believed that the personal experiences of the respondents would most 
enhance the legal knowledge in these fields. The results showed that the knowledge of civil 
law was considerably less than that of penal law. An interesting observation was that the 
level of legal knowledge was the highest among the older agricultural workers. The 
researchers explained this by stating that the civil law code had preserved the old legal 
traditions. Another curious finding of the survey was that the city dwelling women knew 
more about law than men.
The most astonishing result, however, occurred in the survey of the knowledge of 
constitutional law. Researchers posed the same question which had earlier been used in the 
Kulcsár-study, ‘Who or which state organ makes the laws?’, 30% of the cityinhabitant 
physical workers and 24% of the agricultural workers, who belonged to the age group of 
the 1975 sample had answered correctly back in 1965, while only 15% of the total sample 
knew the correct answer in 1975.
Maybe this stunning outcome or the above presented logics of theory construction 
induced the researchers to introduce the category of ‘respect of state’. It is worth mentioning 
here that the ‘respect of state’ as a category had the same, although not so obvious, 
correlation with tolerance and motives in its tendencies as the ‘respect of law’.
The researchers also tried to determine the characteristics of a ‘general attitude’ toward 
the law. Instead of using the Polish school’s ‘one question method’, ‘In your opinion, should 
the law be obeyed if it is corrupt?’, which was heavily criticized, they divided the inquiry 
into three aspects: i. ‘Is the law accessible?’; ii. ‘Does the law produce angst?’ and iii. ‘How 
strong is confidence in the laws and law enforcement agencies?’.
79 Here, the researchers have disregarded the possibilities of interpreting the research results 
differently. It is possible, for instance, that the people tolerating frustration better might risk taking up 
more frustration with acting against deviant behaviour, than those people who do not care about 
deviant behaviour because they want to avoid the frustration that goes along with confrontation. 
Cf. H. Szilágyi (2012).
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The results indicated that for (ad i) the greater the role of personal experiences in the 
knowledge of law resulted in the less accessible the law was considered to be by the 
respondents. The anxiety (ad ii) did not depend on the social position but rather on the 
personal character and the confidence in law (ad iii), the ‘labelling’ respondents were 
strongly confident in the law, which was considered intolerant by them.
The research, conducted in 1976 and led by Kálmán Kulcsár, about the examination of 
the sociological characteristics of civil law litigations was related only indirectly to his 
earlier studies of legal knowledge and legal consciousness.80 The basis of the inquiry was 
the analysis of the judicial case flow statistics that was followed by the study of case 
materials using a prepared questionnaire. The cases were chosen from those which had been 
closed in 1976 and were collected from the district courts of five counties, Baranya, Borsod-
Abaúj-Zemplén, Csongrád, Szabolcs-Szatmár, Vas.81 From our perspective, the most 
important findings of the research can be summarised below.
The great majority of the cases were marital and other family related litigations.82 The 
litigants’ occupational distribution showed that the agricultural physical workers were 
underrepresented, whilst the unskilled city-inhabitant physical workers were overrepresented 
in these legal disputes.83 This reinforced the earlier statements made about the alarming 
moral state of the stratum of unskilled physical workers.84
Interestingly, while the divorce cases constituted more than a quarter (25,54%) of the 
litigations, the proportion of cases related to private rights was much lower (proprietary 
right disputes 4,6%, trespass cases 4,3%) and even the typical market related obligation 
disputes added up only to 11,15%. Kulcsár explained this difference by the fact that the 
legal dispute could not be virtually avoided in the case of divorce.85 At the same time, this 
striking difference also indicated that the private property based market relations were 
pushed into the background in the socialist system. The low number of the property rights 
disputes showed that the litigiousness of the Hungarian population was low in this respect 
– at least, in comparison with what was generally believed about the earlier historical 
periods. This also meant that the inclination and the capacity for using legal means for the 
resolution of social conflicts decreased and, consequently, the confidence in law followed 
this tendency.
The methodology worked out for the examination of the legal consciousness of 
physical workers was applied in a survey in 1976–1977 conducted by Sajó and László 
80 Kulcsár (1982) 203–29.
81 The examined 14450 cases were studies based on different variables, such as the age, gender, 
profession or family status of the people participating in the lawsuit, or the subject, the process and 
the result etc. of the lawsuit. As most of the lawsuits concerned marriage, they applied a 20% sampling 
in this group of lawsuits.
82 The researchers put eight different lawsuit types here: for instance: divorce, paternity and 
descendence, maintenance of a child born in a marriage, maintenance of a child born outside of 
marriage.
83 Agricultural physical workers representing only 13,1% of all litigants only appeared as 7,8% 
in the lawsuit group, while unskilled workers with a 30.4% representation formed 36,6% in this group 
of legal disputes.
84 ‘This phenomenon reflects the fact that in today’s society the least balanced – and quite 
heterogeneous – stratum is that of the unskilled physical workers.’ Kulcsár (1982) 208.
85 However, one of the motives behind the constant growing of the popularity of common-law 
relationships since the 1980s can be the possibility of avoiding the expensive and long divorce 
lawsuits.
342 BALÁZS FEKETE, ISTVÁN H. SZILÁGYI
Boros. They extended the sampling to the whole population including all ages and 
occupational groups. Yet, the great number of the sample (n=3500) meant they did not use 
the PFT test in the course of data collection and, only asked questions related to the fields 
of family and criminal laws for legal knowledge.86
Regarding the conformity and respect of law among physical workers (of all ages), the 
researchers found little difference from the results of the previous year. 56% of the 
respondents proved to be conformist, while 32% were non-conformist (only 1% higher than 
the previous year). This result was calculated on the basis of 2860 processed intelligible 
answers. There was, however, a considerable difference in the proportion of the intolerants 
within the group of conformist respondents – it turned out to be only 48%, in contrast with 
the 87% that had been measured earlier.
With respect to the inquiry of legal knowledge, more or less the same outcomes came 
up as in the earlier studies. The knowledge of criminal law reached the highest level among 
all the investigated fields of law and it seemed to be independent from education.87 This 
was the first time when the researchers observed the phenomenon of ‘normalisation’ during 
the examination of the relation between the knowledge of criminal law and the psychological 
reflection on it. This means that the normative effects of social behaviour could corrupt the 
power of the legal norms over the individual’s actions.88 The later studies also indicated the 
alarming tendencies of normalisation, especially in the case of bribery. It was interesting, 
too, that 44% of the population had felt the situation of criminality worsening in 1973, 
while four years later their proportion reached 52%.
Contrary to criminal law, the knowledge of private law proved to be rather dependent 
on education and more fragmented. The durability of the traditional patriarchal value 
system manifested itself in the fact that less than one third of the Hungarian population 
knew that both spouses were equally considered as the head of the family and two fifths of 
it had not heard about the concept of separate marital property.
The research of legal consciousness of economic managers, made by Sajó in 1977, had 
mostly a methodological importance.89 The small, non-representative sample (n=136) of 
‘socialist enterprise’ managers (CEOs) were asked to evaluate their agreement with 24 
statements90 on a 7-degree scale. The factor analysis of the data was carried out on a 
subsample of n=59, from which 8 factors were constructed,91 which gave the components 
of the managers’ opinions on law. ‘Legal opinion indicators’ were created by weighting 
these factors and assessing their changing proportion. Finally, on the basis of these 
indicators, the researchers defined characteristic ‘types of legal opinion’.92
86 The two researchers published the results in a common, 330 page volume which contains 
many tables. Boros and Sajó (1983).
87 However, the results showed that the criminal law knowledge of the agricultural physical 
workers and housewives was extremely low.
88 In case of the non severe, work thefts only 43% of the population would have issued a 
penalty, while 11% did not condemn such actions at all.
89 Sajó (1981a).
90 E.g. ‘A state enterprise can do anything law entitles it to do.’ ‘A human resource worker with 
the relevant experience knows labour law much better than a lawyer whose field of expertise is not 
labour law.’
91 The factors were divergence from law, corporate anti-formalism, cautiousness, over-
regulation, willing to apply the rules and the style of leadership.
92 The following types of legal opinion were identified as law-abider, cautious law-abider, 
nihilist, cautious nihilist, medium.
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The findings of this research are not surprising for an observer of today. The socialist 
economic managers in the second half of the 1970s were much more concentrating on a 
servient compliance with expectations coming from higher level (political) leaders93 than 
on respecting various peculiar legal provisions. Furthermore, it would have been very 
difficult to observe the law anyway due to the confusing over-regulation of the socialist 
economic sphere.
Another study, conducted a year later, by two criminologists, József Vígh and István 
Tauber on an almost representative sample,94 examined the social evaluation of the criminal 
law regime was closely connected to some parts of the 1977–76 survey that were concerned 
with criminal law. The researchers used layered sampling in which they complemented the 
first, randomly chosen sample in such a way as to make the sample representative for age, 
gender, education and the most important occupational groups. The questionnaires were 
filled out with the guidance of commissioners and 919 intelligible answers were processed.95 
This data were evaluated from five viewpoints: i) the respondents’ knowledge of criminal 
law; ii) their opinion about the ways and aims of punishment; iii) their evaluation of certain 
crimes; iv) their view on the situation of criminality and v) their opinion about the general 
preventive effect of punishment. The answers were analysed with respect to the respondents’ 
gender, age, education and occupational groups and the findings, with particular importance 
for the present study, will be discussed below.
The researchers asked, in the course of the examination of legal knowledge (ad i), the 
respondents to define the concepts of law, crime and contravention and unsurprisingly, the 
proportion of the correct answers stayed below 5% in all three cases. Nevertheless, the 
researchers, taking into account the ‘not perfect but good’ answers and those that ‘contained 
correct elements’, concluded that, even at this very abstract level, the concepts of 
contravention and crime were still more familiar to the respondents than that of law, because 
the respondents met these more frequently in their everyday life and in the media.
For ad ii, in relation to the evaluation of punishment system, the researchers inquired 
about the respondents’ opinion on the aims and bases of punishment, the chances of the 
education of perpetrators and capital punishment. An interesting outcome was that nearly 
half of the respondents thought that most of or all the perpetrators were impossible to 
change by education, while in reality, according to the criminal statistics, two thirds of 
perpetrators had not become recidivist. Notwithstanding, the scholars explained this 
difference not by the recalcitrant prejudices of the population but by the distorting effect of 
the mass media.96
93 The indicator of the willingness of turning towards the leader seems independent of the 
divergence from law indicator. ‘This independence means that the legal or illegal nature did not 
become significant in the case of the economic leaders unlike the hierarchical influence. To put it 
differently, the normative value system does not win over hierarchical power influences. This does not 
sound promising to a leadership system which would like to build on formal regulations.’ Sajó (1981a) 
617.
94 Vígh and Tauber (1983).
95 Sajó – although later he referred to the research results several times – harshly criticised the 
Vígh and Tauber survey on a methodological basis, both from the perspective of sampling and 
the method of questioning. Cf. Sajó (1980) 236. note 20. 
96 ‘[But] it is reasonable to think that the roots of this approach should be found within the 
distorted reflection of consciousness regarding crime. A major percentage of the population, when 
they hear the word ʻcriminal’, think about the perpetrator of a severe, violent crime. This approach is 
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The evaluation of certain crimes was examined by enquiring what kind of punishment 
the respondents would impose in six different cases: three crimes against life, two against 
property (petty embezzlement, petty larceny) and a case of espionage. 95% of the 
respondents chose punishments identical to those prescribed in the Criminal Code in 1973. 
It was also thought-provoking that 20% of the respondents would have also punished a 
mentally impaired perpetrator in the case of homicide.
It is suspected, once more, that the above mentioned distorting effect of the socialist 
communication structure when looking at the outcomes of the evaluation of the situation of 
criminality (ad iv). The respondents generally underrated the number of committed crimes. 
It fluctuated around 120–150 thousand per year in the previous decade, only 3 thousandths 
of the sample marked this number, and 47.5% of them felt a rising tendency in the number 
of crimes, contrary to the real situation of stagnation.
From a methodological point of view, it was remarkable that the researchers tried to 
explore those psychical motivations which may prohibit the commission of a crime (ad v). 
They presupposed that those people had a different psychical structure who had already 
been in a situation where they could have committed a crime (‘criminalising situation’) – 
they had experienced a ‘conflict of motives’. Therefore, the respondents were first asked 
whether they had been in a ‘criminalising situation’,97 and second, what kind of motivation 
could keep them from committing a crime. However, the outcomes showed no considerable 
difference between the two groups, in terms of the proportion of the different motivations, 
e.g., while 68% of the respondents who had already been in a ‘criminalising situation’ 
stated that mostly their conscience had prevented them from committing a crime and 74% 
of those who had not had such an experience answered the same. In light of these outcomes, 
the researchers’ conclusion, which was a bit ‘too nice’, that is, that the preventive effect of 
potential punishment was overshadowed by the moral and other motivations, could not 
escape the contemporaries’ criticism.98
The 1979 study by Sajó is mostly relevant from a methodological aspect. It examined 
the legal consciousness of caretakers in Budapest and, on the basis of this, the influence of 
the social group on the individual legal consciousness.99 The researchers processed the 
answers given in the guided interviews and the results of tests filled out by the respondents 
of the small (n=91), not representative sample. Sajó tried to combine the methods used in 
the earlier strata surveys: the two-step interview method of the respect-of-law indicator and 
the factor analysis. Despite the complicated methodology, the study led to a very 
questionable conclusion, due to a trivial fault in the theory, as mentioned above, that 
contradicted all earlier Hungarian and international research findings. ‘The group, this 
also suggested by our mass communication devices. It has been discovered that, for example, 80% of 
the news broadcasting devices deal with violent crimes and their perpetrators, whereas the percentage 
of such crimes among the whole range of crimes is only 8–10%.’ [Highlights in the original] Vígh and 
Tauber (1983).
97 Almost 62% of the pollees said that they have never experienced a situation urging them to 
commit a crime. However, there was a huge difference among those responding with a ‘yes’ to this 
question in terms of their gender: 52% of men, but only 23% of women remembered a criminalizing 
situation. In the age distribution, those between the age of 19–30 represented a high percentage.
98 Cf. Sajó’s critique Sajó (1980) 236. However, a difference can be discovered behind Sajó’s 
harsh critique which stood between the fairly optimistic view on the people of the two criminologists 
and that of Sajó’s pessimist understanding of the homo kádáricus. 
99 Sajó (1981b). 
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‘most social psychological’ object of social psychology, does not seem to be a conclusive 
factor in the formation of legal opinion and unlawful behaviour.’100 The most important 
outcome of the study was that the results of the PFT tests corroborated the observation of 
the 1975 strata survey, namely that the people who were more tolerant of frustrations, 
showed more intolerance of deviant behaviour.
3.4. The new topics of the 1980s – anthropological foundations and socialization
Sajó’s summary Respecting Law and Social Behaviour, mentioned above when discussing 
his aim to establish a legal theoretical foundation, was published in 1980. Here, he 
synthesized the international and Hungarian empirical findings in his chapter on legal 
consciousness. Moreover, he deepened the theoretical bases of the 1975 survey (presented 
earlier) and also explored several aspects of KOL researches not yet studied. Before taking 
a closer look at these aspects, it is worth making a detour to outline certain features of the 
image of the human psyche presupposed by these theoretical endeavours. This is important 
because this distinctive Hobbesian philosophical anthropology101 will give the basis for the 
firm critical attitude that has become more and more apparent in Sajó’s theory in the next 
decade.
The classical view of the three constituents of the human soul are will, intellect and 
emotion.102 Sajó points out regarding the element of will ‘I think that Ryle is right in 
regarding will as a cursed inheritance of the free will theories and in reconstructing it on the 
basis of cognitive and affective (weighting) elements and, therefore, we do not ascribe real 
independent existence to will.’103 He declares, regarding will, that ‘Rational consistency, as 
a social demand, is essentially limited to judging the others. The individual either cynically 
accepts factual inconsistency or methodically distorts their opinion towards the facade of 
rationalization.’104 This statement means that the only available option for the individual is 
the subsequent rationalization. What kind of driving force then remains for the individual, 
lacking will and intellect? Nothing but the fear of the individual exposed to power, to the 
Hobbesian Leviathan. Add to this that Sajó rejects the idea that a distinct psychological 
motivation, as he included it several times in his Podgórecki-criticism, a particular ‘sense of 
justice’, would have to exist behind the law, the Homo kádáricus emerges – the coward 
mass-man who has no will, no intellect and no virtues whatsoever and who slavishly 
submits himself to power. It is another question how this image could be used ironically for 
the interpretation of the author’s position. This disillusioned, pessimistic anthropology 
explains the exaggerated statements of Sajó, which even contradict empirical facts, e.g., the 
group does not influence the legal consciousness or that it is unacceptable that most people 
keep themselves from the commission of crime for reasons of conscience.
100 Sajó (1981b) 61. The insupportablity of this thesis might have also be seen by Sajó himself, 
as later on he has never referred to this research in this aspect. 
101 The ʻHobbesian’ attribute is not incidental. In the middle of the 1970s Sajó has indeed dealt 
with Hobbes’s views intensively, along with political philosophical research and research on the 
history of ideas. See: Sajó (1974a); Sajó (1974b); and Sajó (1975a). 
102 The classic threefold division of the human soul goes back at least as far as Plato in the 
history of European thinking. Cf. Plato: Republic. Book IV. 
103 Sajó (1980) 230. note 8.
104 Sajó (1980) 238. [Highlights in the original].
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At the same time, it must be mentioned that Sajó himself could not work out a 
consistent theoretical framework based on his anthropological presuppositions. His 
intellectual orientation changed subsequently and this self-destructive view gradually 
disappeared as Sajó was growing alienated from Marxism in the 1980s and his attitude 
became quite sceptical and critical of the socialist system. István Bibó’s humanist historical 
philosophy probably also gave momentum to this transition.105
Thus, Sajó’s first inconsistency with his anthropological presuppositions can be seen 
right at the start of his theoretical endeavour to explore the structure of legal consciousness, 
for he began his reasoning with declaring that to understand legal consciousness, one 
needed to examine those ‘extraordinary situations’ which required conscious, wilful 
decisions. The behaviour-influencing effect of law becomes visible only in this kind of 
situations, when the individual is enforced to renounce the comfort of habitual action. 
At the societal level, the number of ‘extraordinary situations’ is constantly growing with the 
historical process of modernization, going along with splitting up the traditional 
communities and diminishing the possibilities for habitual action. Probably, the source of 
Sajó’s invention of this new theoretical starting point was Helmuth Schelsky’s research106 
and fortunately not Carl Schmitt’s political philosophy.
Following this, Sajó explained his ideas about the structure of legal consciousness and 
legal knowledge; the distinction between the societal and individual levels and the influence 
of the individual’s experiences on legal consciousness – all of which he had formulated at 
the beginning of the 1975 survey. Moreover, he started to pay new intellectual attention to 
the analysis of media effect on the opinions about law. He introduced the two-step 
information flow model, according to which the reputation of higher level mediators gave 
credit to the information for the recipients on a lower level. He also claimed that the 
informational monopoly of political power was closely connected to its legitimizing 
prestige. At the same time, he raised some counter-arguments to the idea of media influence. 
He pointed out the well-known difficulties of indirect communication whilst he emphasised 
that the law-abiding behaviour could exist without this kind of information and that the 
information about law could not be identified with the knowledge of law. In sum, he held 
the fairly exaggerated view that the acceptance of legal rules could not derive from 
communication.
The recognition of the influence of socialization on the formation of legal consciousness 
as an important aspect meant a substantive extension of the original theoretical foundations. 
Here, based primarily on Piaget’s developmental psychology and on the findings of the 
contemporary political and legal sociological studies, Sajó discussed those elements of 
personality development in certain phases of socialization that were important for the 
observance of law.
In the summary of his otherwise thought-provoking discussion, Sajó managed to come 
up with rather laconic107 conclusions: ‘Three immediate causes of the […] observance of 
105 Sajó explicitly refers to Bibó’ study A kelet-európai kisállamok nyomorúsága in his writing 
published in 1986. Sajó (1986) 298.
106 In this work, Sajó did not refer to Schelsky at all, but it is certain that he knew his work 
because in a legal-sociological textbook edited by him, published a year before, one of Schelsky’s 
studies was included. Schelsky (1979) For an analysis and further assessment of Schelsky’s theory 
see: H. Szilágyi (2012).
107 As we saw earlier in the conclusion of the survey about the legal consciousness of caretakers 
(1979) Sajó discarded the influencing effect of the group. Opposed to this, one year later he writes in 
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legal rules can be outlined: 1. the fear of sanctions; 2. rational deliberations; 3. the 
authority of legal rules.’108
The KOL studies gradually lost their momentum in the next decade. This was partly 
due to both Kulcsár and Sajó turning their attention to the study of the socio-legal changes 
associated to the modernization process occurring in the second part of the 1980’s.109 This 
tendency is clearly indicated by the outcomes of the survey on the evaluation of civil law, 
made in 1984, remained partly unprocessed and information about them can only obtained 
from Sajó’s sporadic references in his work published in 1986. The last representative KOL 
research, conducted in 1986, became almost completely forgotten.
The final report of Pál Léderer and Sajó’s study on legal socialization in 1982 also 
only remained in manuscript form. In the course of the survey, fourth grade secondary 
school pupils (n=263) in Budapest and Pécs and some of their parents and teachers (n=406) 
were asked about morally-influenced matters, e.g. abortion, medical gratuity, bribery by 
person in need. A new step was added to the earlier used, two-step interview method used. 
First, it was asked whether the current law punished the matter at hand; the respondent was 
asked whether they would punish the deed,110 and, finally, they had to give their opinion 
after they had been informed about what the actual legal regulation. It indicated the 
authority of positive law, if the respondent changed their mind in this third phase. For 
example, in the case of usucaption, 80% of those who had previously known this legal 
institution, considered it rightful, as compared to only 46% of those who had not. Nearly 
40% of this latter group changed their opinion after been told about the legal regulation.111
László Korinek also did not publish his candidate’s thesis – the empirical basis of 
which was a representative survey in Baranya county (n=2448), using questionnaires sent 
via post.112 From the viewpoint of the KOL studies, the most important result of this study 
was the measurement of the population’s evaluation of the situation of crime. In comparison 
with the results of the 1976–77 survey, the proportion of those who believed that the number 
of crimes was on the rise grew by 5% (up to 57%) within the whole population.113
The Dankánics–Erdősi survey of the viewers of Blue Light (a TV-programme focusing 
on criminality), from a decade earlier, probably inspired the inquiry led by Neményi Mária 
and Sajó in 1984.114 However, this later study differed from the former research – it 
concentrated on the legal consciousness concerning private law instead of the penal 
system – but also in its sampling method and theoretical approach. This time, the researchers 
one of his articles: ‘The reaction of the reference group of the person to the potential breach of law is 
especially important.’ Sajó (1980) 310.
108 Sajó (1980) 316. [Highlights in the original]
109 Kulcsár (1986); Kulcsár (1989); Sajó (1988).
110 In their personal opinion, 50% of the respondents diverging from the assumed legal solution 
would allow prostitution, 93% of students tolerated bribe taking into consideration the desperate 
situation of the briber, and 60% would allow constructions without permission. It is interesting to note 
that students decide on the case of defection more strictly (only 33% tolerated it) than their teachers 
(about half of them tolerated it).
111 Typically, the students holding a position at the school – the future ʻkáders’ – were more 
conformist than the others: they changed their opinion in a 61% ratio after getting to know the legal 
regulations. 
112 Korinek (1984).
113 20–30% of the pollees assumed that they will be victims of a crime within a year, and 43% 
was afraid to walk around their homes at night.
114 Neményi and Sajó (1984).
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tried to assess the viewers’ legal consciousness and the structure of everyday thinking about 
legal problems on the basis of the content analysis of viewers’ letters to the television 
programme Legal Cases.115
Under the guidance of law professors, law students conducted the content analysis of 
randomly chosen 2538 letters, which were written to the 26 most popular broadcastings of 
the past years. The topics of the broadcastings eliciting the highest viewer activity were 
primarily cases of family and private law and, in a lesser part, of labour law.116 The 
researchers carefully studied not only the subgroups of the writers by age and gender but 
also the specific psychological state behind this sort of activity, which obviously differed 
from that of the respondents participating in a survey.117 On the basis of the content analysis, 
20 variables of legal consciousness were distinguished118 and the most important factors of 
the acquisition of legal knowledge were separately examined.119
Two findings are worth pointing out here from the outcomes of the research. One 
insight was the distorting effect of the mass media, in so far as that the authors realised the 
problem that the primary aim of the broadcasting –to improve the viewers’ level of legal 
knowledge and try to enhance their legal consciousness – was overshadowed by its latent, 
entertaining function. Secondly, the researchers also shed light on the particular relationship 
of law and morals ‘An interesting lesson of the views mirrored in the letters is that the 
moral and the legal consciousness appear to run parallel to each other. As if the normative 
world of the moral values based on traditions or on interest-motivated customs had a 
separate life within the letter-writing society, the psychological authenticity and behaviour-
controlling force of which is evident for the writers.’120
115 In the series starting at the middle of the 1970s mainly civil law and some labour law cases 
were introduced. They sometimes used captions taken at the ‘crime scene’ or interviews with the 
participation of the two sides to present the case. After this, they have presented letters coming from 
the audience, reacting to the cases previously presented, and the ‘good solution’ was introduced to the 
audience by one of the judges of the Supreme Court or a high-ranking official of the Ministry of 
Justice, who, after a while, became some sort of celebrities. As a result of this dramaturgic 
construction, the program started to resemble a quiz or an entertainment show. The popularity of the 
show is indicated by the fact that a part of the audience letters were written by groups of people 
gathered deliberately for this purpose.
116 The three most popular topics were, ‘The unwanted child’, ‘The old husband’ and 
‘Confiscating land’
117 ‘We can assume a certain type of ‘letter-writer syndrome’ which is in correlation with 
loneliness, the hindered nature of informal communication, hot-temperedness, neuroticism or the 
societal psychological state of ‘infantilism’ as called by Hankiss.’ Neményi and Sajó (1984) 217.
118 These were apology; personal involvement; communication; favoring a solution through 
state intervention; highlighting personal problems in the case; penalty for the plaintive; penalty for the 
defendant; arguments for the solution – which were dissected into the variables of referring to 
negative social consequences, individual harmful consequences, authoritarian references and 
references to fairness – referring to precedent; bringing forward a personal case; change of situation; 
the relation between the TV solution and the individual solution (legal knowledge); legal references, 
attitude towards the protagonists; attribution; legal evaluation; and summarizing the variables of 
abstraction, deduction, induction in the index of the way of thinking. 
119 When examining the main variables of the acquisition of legal knowledge, a result supporting 
the above mentioned claim of the ‘letter-writing syndrome’ emerged, as the three most important 
variables turned out to be the request to punish the defendant (occurring in 71% of the letters), the 
request to punish the plaintive (50%) and highlighting a personal problem (34%). 
120 Neményi-Sajó (1984) 238.
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4. ILLUSION AND REALITY IN THE LAW –  
AN ATTEMPT AT THEORETICAL SYNTHESIS AND THE OUTLINES  
OF THE HUNGARIAN LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE KÁDÁR-ERA
Sajó published his Illusion and Reality in Law in 1986, having managed more than a decade 
of empirical study and theory building.121 The volume’s claim for synthesis is evident from 
the title and no single chapter leaves no doubt. The parts of the book detailing the various 
fields of law – private, administrative and penal law – through the critical and comparative 
analysis of the relevant international scholarly literature have a rather synchronic nature. 
They can be seen as the diagnostic results of the legal system of the Kádár-era and of its 
functions and dysfunctions.122 The most essential chapter is the seventh, Worlds of Believes 
– On This Side the Door of Law. The author here endeavours to reconstruct the concept of 
legal consciousness, founding it on theoretical theses formulated on the basis of his own 
earlier research and can be considered as the summary of the theoretical findings of the 
Hungarian KOL studies gathering momentum in the 1970s. As such, it is of outstanding 
importance for the evaluation of the results of the socialist era.
Sajó’s primary thesis is that the law generally plays a lesser role in the everyday life of 
the Hungarian society than would be expected from the outcomes of international studies 
and surveys. The Hungarian legal culture therefore is alienated from law, albeit this attribute 
is not exclusive to Hungary.123
The first step towards the explanation of legal alienation is the working out of an 
applicable model of legal consciousness which enables the theoretical location of the 
observed problems and the interpretation of data. Sajó’s concept of legal consciousness is 
built on three elements: (i) legal knowledge, (ii) the emotional-volitional and (iii) the 
evaluating elements.124 He deals with them separately – although not hermetically separating 
them – using the critical perspective offered by the foreign literature and earlier research. 
As a result of this method, he is capable of giving a detailed picture about the elements of 
legal consciousness and about their functions and dysfunctions.
4.1. The knowledge of law and the criticism of its studies
Sajó first analyses the problems of legal knowledge. In his opinion, this category stands the 
closest to conventional legal thinking and has the greatest quantity of research material and 
experience available.125 Despite admitting the importance of legal knowledge in shaping 
legal consciousness, he remains pessimistic about the idea that through the study of legal 
knowledge ‘the build-up of reality […] in social consciousness, originating in the world 
121 Sajó (1986).
122 For example when analysing the housing situation of the 1970s Sajó highlights that it is 
actually an administrative question ‘while the haunting of the civil law forms is an old-manly gesture 
towards the reigning or assumedly reigning forms of the legal system.’ Moreover, the black market in 
the housing market emerges despite the strictest state supervision. Sajó (1986) 116–17.
123 Sajó (1986) 273. and 80–82. (Referring to Kulcsár the problem had already been outlined)
124 Sajó (1986) 274.
125 The former statement is true in international and also domestic aspects. This is because the 
results of Kulcsár’s previously introduced research became known and appreciated in the professional 
circles in the following two decades, thus they directly and indirectly influenced later empirical 
research as well. See the part of the current study dealing with Kulcsár’s research on legal knowledge.
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view of law and of legal system’ can be grasped.126 This scepticism implicitly contradicts 
Kulcsár’s conception that held legal knowledge as the researchable and quantifiable starting 
point for the study of social ideas about law.127
According to Sajó, the researcher has to face the following dilemmas in the course of 
studying legal knowledge:
(a) This kind of research has been done by lawyers and especially by scholars and 
students of law the outcomes is typically evaluated in the light of the idea of rightness. This 
is similar to university exams when the knowledge of law is measured on the basis of 
whether the answers are correct.128
(b) This kind of capability of thinking in legal categories, which is more or less 
evidently present in the case of the knowledge acquired in the course of legal education, is 
highly absent from everyday thinking. The common knowledge of law is basically (i) 
casuistic – not systematised; (ii) related to formal-legal elements, e.g., to a contract; (iii) 
formal legal roles, such as the roles of the judges or attorneys. The structure of ordinary 
knowledge of law differs in its nature from professional knowledge and is fragmented and 
often situational, in comparison to the latter.129
(c) The knowledge of the rules of law is not relevant in every case, for the citizens are 
not familiar with the abstract rules but only with rules applied in concrete situations, 
encountered in normative practices. They have knowledge regarding these and not about 
the black letter of law. Nevertheless, the social practices based on law can differ or surpass 
legal rules, as it has been indicated by a number of studies. That is why the explanatory 
force of the knowledge of abstract rule is seriously questionable from a legal sociological 
perspective.130
(d) Even if the citizens know certain rules, it is far from certain whether they know 
anything about the application of those rules. This, therefore, raises the question whether 
the sheer knowledge of the rules of law – supposing that the law is more than the sum of 
black letter law – means a real legal knowledge, whether it is relevant at all.131
(e) How far do the answers of the citizens reflect their real legal knowledge, because 
they could be distorted by several factors. Sajó underlines the factors of wishful thinking, 
the citizens’ expectations to identify themselves with law and of fear. Here, the researcher 
has to face the impact of other, non-legal, dimensions of legal consciousness.132
(f) ‘Pure’ legal knowledge probably does not exist at all because the knowledge of law 
is often mixed with evaluative elements, similar to the previous point. Another influencing 
factor could be the respondent’s opinion about the likelihood of a certain legal consequence, 
because the consideration of their own situation could alter their answers concerning legal 
knowledge.133
126 Sajó (1986) 284.
127 On the other hand, in a history of ideas sense Sajó’s attitude shows that the domestic legal 
sociology has evolved a lot in two decades, because Sajó as a member of the next generation has 
simultaneously arrived at criticising the ‘founding’ results through integrating them, thus further 
developing the whole scientific area. This means that we have found a ʻcrossword puzzle solving’ 
research in this case.
128 Sajó (1986) 274.
129 Sajó (1986) 275.
130 Sajó (1986).
131 Sajó (1986).
132 Sajó (1986) 275–76.
133 Sajó (1986) 277.
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(g) Sajó calls attention to legal knowledge being of a casuistic nature – it is shaped by 
a range of specific situations rather than by principles. This is why one cannot presuppose 
the existence of some abstract legal principles behind the answers concerning legal 
knowledge.134
It can be seen that Sajó regards the concept of legal knowledge as problematic as it is 
hardly compatible with the recent findings of social sciences, especially because it is not 
able to account for the social and psychological mechanisms of knowledge.135 Sajó himself 
sees the role of the research of legal knowledge in the study of legal consciousness as ‘[…] 
the organizing principles [of legal knowledge] do not empirically control legal consciousness 
– sometimes these principles are formulated only by mathematical-statistical analysis – but 
they could be useful as methodological constructions for the representation of the legal 
consciousness.’136
4.2. The emotional-volitional and the evaluative elements
The emotional-volitional and the evaluative elements – the evaluation of the currently 
existing law and the ideas about a desired future law – make up the other part of legal 
consciousness. Less room is dedicated to these problematics in the ‘theoretical part’ of the 
seventh chapter in comparison to the critical examination of legal knowledge. Furthermore, 
these elements are often represented by Sajó with their mutual interconnections and will be 
approached in the same fashion here. The cause of this somehow less-detailed discussion 
probably is that there had not been such an elaborate tradition of the study of these 
dimensions of legal consciousness at the time, so the relevant empirical experiences and 
theories at hand were fewer than in the case of legal knowledge. Correspondingly, Sajó’s 
argumentation here is descriptive rather than critical.
The underlying hypothesis is similar to what Sajó stated in the analysis of legal 
knowledge. He submits that the abstract, general questions have no relevance in this field, 
because both the acceptance and the evaluation of law could be interpreted from several 
angles. For example, citizens’ acceptance of law can be studied at least from three points of 
view: (i) how far does they accept the law as the measure their own actions; (ii) in a given 
situation; (iii) and as a measure of others’ behaviour.
Also, the evaluation of law is similarly complex because it can refer to (i) the 
evaluation of law in general or (ii) to the evaluation of certain legal institutions. Nothing 
can guarantee that the individual opinions, in these respects, will converge.137 So the 
correlation between the general evaluation of law and of the specific legal institutions is 
uncertain. It follows – in Sajó’s opinion – that the study of legal intuition or the attitudes 
toward law, what he cynically called the quest for the philosopher’s stone, can lead to 
dubious results as law can be the object of a general and public respect. This does not 
exclude the avoidance of law in specific situations – in the citizens’ opinion.138
Another important aspect of the mapping of legal consciousness is the inclusion of the 
emotional elements. Emotions cannot be ignored, argues Sajó, because (i) they play a role 
in moulding the opinions about law; (ii) they can intensify the knowledge of law and, in 
134 Sajó (1986) 277–78.
135 Sajó (1986) 277.
136 Sajó (1986) 278.
137 Sajó (1986) 278–79.
138 Sajó (1986) 279.
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this way, encourage the legal subject to act; and, (iii) they influence the reception of 
knowledge, e.g., up to the point where the knowledge of a given legal rule can depend on 
emotional motivations. However, this important dimension is pushed into the background 
and sometimes completely overlooked. It is a pity that Sajó, apart from mentioning this 
aspect, has not carried his studies further onto this interesting direction.139
Relying on the social psychological literature, Sajó calls attention to the problem that 
‘it is not enough to concentrate on concrete substances of mind’ in the course of this study 
of the legal culture but ‘we also have to observe those cognitive structures in which these 
substances are positioned and which determine the manner of their connections.’140 
He distinguishes the ‘dogmatic mind’ and the ‘open mind’ from this point of view. While 
the former tends to take only one point of view into consideration, which leads to 
dichotomies in the results, e.g. good or bad, the latter strives to free itself from the original 
circumstances and to find outside perspectives. These structures have outstanding 
importance in the reduction of reality, because the structural differences between the 
‘dogmatic mind’ and the ‘open mind’ are conclusive in the determination of the mutual 
relations between legal knowledge and legal consciousness and of what kind of knowledge 
can be acquired, ‘integrated’, using psychological language, by the citizens.141
4.3. The value and sense of KOL studies
Sajó himself poses the question, after all this criticism, whether there is still a point in the 
KOL researches for the study of the law’s everyday influence.142 His answer is fairly 
pragmatic – care must be taken with the results, because conclusions may not be easily 
drawn regarding the real influence of law from the attitudes deduced from the findings, as 
the opinion leaders play an essential role in the formation of these attitudes. Furthermore, 
it could be difficult to understand the reality of the law’s influence that sometimes there 
might be a great distance between an individual’s actions and their opinion and evaluation 
concerning law. Notwithstanding all these objections, Sajó claims that from the data 
collected by various KOL studies, partial knowledge of the role that the law plays in the 
social interpretation of reality can be acquired and, besides, a rather accurate picture on the 
mechanisms of the legal system can be obtained.
4.4.  The characteristics of Hungarian legal consciousness in the Kádár-era – 
deformity and alienation
Sajó’s starting point, as mentioned above, is that the Hungarian legal consciousness is 
foreign to law and, in this sense (along with a lot of other ‘senses’), a Hungarian’s views 
are profoundly differ from those of a citizen of a western country. ‘It seems as if the legal 
interpretation of reality was not a part of our social culture, apart from legal life, in the strict 
sense of the word.’143 The underlying cause of this is that the law cannot be regarded as an 
organic element in the life of the citizens as a natural means of handling and resolving 
139 Sajó (1986) 280. It has to be mentioned that researching sentiments has come into the centre 
of Sajó’s scholarly interest after two decades, and then he started to deal with the problem in a 
nuanced frame, more thoroughly. See: Sajó (2011). 
140 Sajó (1986) 280.
141 Sajó (1986) 281–82.
142 Sajó (1986) 282.
143 Sajó (1986) 309.
353KNOWLEDGE AND OPINION ABOUT LAW (KOL) RESEARCH IN SOCIALIST HUNGARY
conflicts. Only when the citizens want to invite the state to take part in their conflicts do 
they turn to the law.144 The law functions as an outside point of reference, which is able to 
draw the attention of the state organs to the citizen, which could eventually help settle any 
stalemate between the citizens.
Another deformity arises from the fact that the legal system of the Kádár-era hindered 
the enforcement of the subjective rights in numerous ways, as to diminish the chances of 
those who would try to assert or enforce these rights individually. In parallel, the importance 
of legal arguments became reduced, which in turn exerted a serious impact both on legal 
knowledge and legal consciousness. This is especially true in those situations when the 
citizen must face the power manifested in some state organ as the success of legal 
argumentation is hopeless for numerous reasons, ‘begging, the gestures of clemency-
seeking loyalty and references to fairness (not so much on the merits), or, at most, on 
equality are asserted.’145
Sajó’s final evaluation, which is very telling of the previously analysed legal 
consciousness in the Kádár-era, is that the reference to duty is the only dimension where 
‘[…] the law can successfully enter [the everyday legal thinking, too] and this indicates the 
state of the legal culture, of legal consciousness and (partly) of the effective regulation.’146
4.5.  The characteristics of Hungarian legal consciousness in the Kádár-era – 
conformity and nonconformity, tolerance and intolerance
The Hungarian legal consciousness of the 1970s and 1980s can also be described from the 
perspective of legalism, with the help of the above mentioned characteristics, whether the 
law was approached with adherence or with criticism. Sajó first used these categories – the 
dichotomies of tolerance-intolerance and conformity-nonconformity with respect to law – 
in 1975 when studying the blue-collar workers’ legal consciousness. Here he completes the 
earlier data with the outcomes of a more recent survey on the evaluation of family and 
penal law provisions, conducted in 1983 on a fairly representative sample (n=3000).
Interestingly. Sajó points out that ‘the most prevailing standpoint is the adherence to 
the supposedly intolerant law’ 147 – this conclusion is worth special attention in the light of 
the above indicated problem of the Hungarians’ legal consciousness, namely, the alienation 
from law. The vast majority of the Hungarian citizens (87%) suppose that the law calls for 
punishment for a specific deed, even in those cases when the given deed is not punishable 
in fact. In half of the cases represented in the questionnaire, the described actions were not 
unlawful. Furthermore, it is also observable that a part of the population believes that the 
law is more severe than it is in reality and this is clearly related to their own generally 
punitive evaluation. On the other hand, most of those who wish the mitigation of a sentence 
usually did not agree with the given rule applied in the specific case in the first place.
The Hungarian population of the Kádár-era accepted the law and, indeed, in most of 
the cases, they hold it to be more severe than it is in the reality. The explanation of this is 
the desire to punish (punitivity) pervading the ranks of the population. This can be seen as 
parallel to the ‘legal conformist – legalist’ type described in France, which combines the 
144 Sajó (1986) 309.
145 Sajó (1986) 311.
146 Sajó (1986) 312.
147 Sajó (1986) 289.
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acceptance and approval of law with a strong demand for punishment.148 In summary, it can 
be seen that a quite paradoxical situation emerges in the legal consciousness of the Kádár-
era – citizens generally seek to resolve their problems outside the law, nonetheless, they 
expect the law to severely punish others! A better example could not be found for the 
hypocrisy and schizophrenia on a social level that was so characteristic of the public 
thinking in general at the time.149
5. SUMMARY: ONLY A DEAD LETTER?
The evaluation of the ‘socialist jurisprudence’ and, thus, the establishment of some kind of 
relationship to it is not as an easy task as would seem at first sight.150 Quite complex 
problematic have to be faced in order to avoid the danger of simplification. That is why a 
comprehensive evaluation was not undertaken but instead, the outcomes exclusively from 
an outside, contextual point of view and from an inside, professional perspective have been 
considered.
5.1. The contextual perspective
Kulcsár’s study, conducted nearly half a century ago, is relevant because of its novelty, 
courage and its findings. It is also important for the development of the Hungarian empirical 
legal sociology for two other reasons. The first is a historical one. A closer look at its 
methodology and results reveals that this study had opened a broad room for the later 
empirical researches and had also provided a conceptual framework for them. This is why 
the separation of legal knowledge and legal consciousness and the distinction between the 
dynamic aspect of legal knowledge and its static description were so crucial. The possibly 
unintended fruitfulness of Kulcsár’s theoretical endeavours has been proved by the sheer 
number of the later researches.
Sajó’s works, due to the sharp critical sense of the author, brought the hypocrisy of the 
legal consciousness of the Kádár-era to the surface. However, it has to be pointed out that 
by exploring the inner contradictions – alienation from law versus strong demand for 
punishment – of the Hungarian legal consciousness, he detected a more fundamental, 
‘evergreen’, characteristic feature of the Hungarian attitudes towards law, which probably 
dates back to the second half of the 19th century. When Sajó studied this problem in the 
context of the post-1956 socialist period, he himself emphasised its similarities with the 
traditional Hungarian peasant views on law in the inter-war period – quoting Ernő Tárkány-
148 Sajó (1986) 293.
149 Based on a wide-spread survey conducted in December 1986 by TÁRKI, Sajó thoroughly 
analysed the population’s consciousness of rights with the SPSS program – a very modern tool for the 
time. The results of the empirical research converge with the conclusions of Látszat és valóság: the 
legal culture of the late Kádár-era is very far from a ‘western-pattern’ legal culture, in which one of 
the determining elements of the societal functioning of law is formed by the civil assertion of legal 
claims. In Sajó’s words: ‘The claim for right is pragmatic, the recognition of basic legal protection 
and the validation of human dignity to everyone is almost absent from it, it is characterised by 
primitive rebellion and practical submissions without making the authoritarian legitimacy of the law 
enforcement bodies questionable.’ Sajó (1988–1989) esp. 145–174. (quote from: 173.)
150 For a presentation of the distinct approaches see, for example, the studies of Péter Cserne, 
Miklós Szabó, Péter Szilágyi or Csaba Varga. Cserne (2004); Szabó (2004); Szilágyi (2004) and Varga 
(2004).
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Szűcs’s151 and Ferenc Erdei’s152 works about this subject. He also tended to accept the idea 
of the survival of these mental structures,153 which were shaped much earlier.
Finally, the KOL studies, which had been started by Kulcsár’s investigations, were 
continued later by an increasingly wider scholarly community and had even gained Imre 
Szabó’s approval and theoretical support. They became an essential field of socialist legal 
theoretical reflexions. The reliance on facts and the up-to-date reviews of the international 
scholarly literature ensured the compliance with high academic standards and the possibility 
of criticism.
5.2. The professional aspects
Finally, the scholarly aspects of the Hungarian KOL studies can be approached from three 
prominent perspectives.
First, it is worth considering those dimensions of legal consciousness that were 
investigated thoroughly in the course of these more than two decades of study. These are 
the following:
(i) The psychological (PFT test) and social psychological structure, indicator of the 
respect of law, the motivations of law-abiding behaviour, demand for punishment, the 
relations of legal consciousness – opinion – behaviour, normalization, legalism, of legal 
consciousness;
(ii) The relations between legal knowledge and legal consciousness;
(iii) The influence of social structure on legal knowledge and consciousness;
(iv) The survey on the legal knowledge of various branches of law (criminal, family 
and civil law).
Secondly, there are other fields beyond these that were only touched upon occasionally 
but not explored in details, such as:
(i) The impact of mass media on legal consciousness;
(ii) Legal socialization. Sajó wrote about the theoretical aspects of this in his work 
published in 1980 and see also the empirical study of secondary school pupils conducted in 
1982;
(iii) Historical experiences. This theme emerged in the 1975 study of the physical 
workers’ legal consciousness;
(iv) The social groups’ influence on individual legal consciousness, e.g., the 
controversial conclusions of the methodologically mistaken survey on caretakers’ legal 
consciousness;
(v) The relationship between the ‘respect of state’ (politics) and law in legal 
consciousness;
(vi) The schizophrenic separation of law and morals;
(vii) The legal knowledge dimension of labour law.
Finally, it should be mentioned the following topics that could have been raised but 
remained neglected in the researches (mainly due to the above described ideological and 
historical context):
(i) The relations between the social value system and the system of legal attitudes;
(ii) The connections between the social character (mentality) and legal consciousness;
(iii) The problems of legal culture.
151 Tárkány-Szűcs (1981). 
152 Erdei (1974).
153 Sajó (1986) 298–99.
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Our response to the starting question raised above in the subheading is a definite ‘no’ 
in the light of what was discussed earlier. The KOL studies of the socialist era created a 
tradition that can be continued today. This tradition offers an excellent starting point for 
comparative studies in terms of the empirical data, methodology and theoretical conceptions. 
One of the most interesting questions for the resumed studies could concern the extent of 
the influence of the post-1989 political, social and economic changes on the legal 
consciousness of the Hungarian population on the one hand and, vice versa, the extent to 
which the schizophrenic mind set of the legal consciousness of the Kádár-era has influenced 
the formation of these new social structures on the other hand. It can only be hoped that the 
newly resumed KOL studies may reach again the level of intensity of the studies in the 
1970s-80s.
LITERATURE
Bankowski, Zenon and Mungham, Geoff, Images of Law (Routledge & Kegan Paul 1976).
Boros, László and Sajó, András, A család és a családi jog megjelenése az állampolgárok tudatában. 
Jogtudat, jogismeret (Family and Family Law in the Consciousness of the Citizens. Legal 
Consciousness and Knowledge about Law) (MTA Szociológiai Intézet 1983).
Cserne, Péter, ‘Gazdaság és jog viszonya a marxista jogelméletben és a jog gazdasági elemzésében’ 
(The Relationship between Economy and Law in the Marxist Legal Theory and Economic 
Analysis of Law) (2004) 4 Világosság 49–63.
Dankánics, Mária and Erdősi, Sándor, A „Kék Fény” közvéleménye. Egy közönségkutatás tapasztalatai 
(The Public Opinion of the “Blue Light”. Experiences of an Audience Survey) (MRT TK 1974).
Erdei, Ferenc, A magyar falu (The Hungarian Village) (Akadémiai Kiadó 1974).
Fekete, Balázs and H. Szilágyi, István, ‘Jogtudat-kutatások a szocialista Magyaroszágon’ (KOL 
Researches in the Socialist Hungary) (2014) 4 Iustum Aequum Salutare 5–40.
Fleck, Zoltán, ‘Szocialista jogelmélet és szociológia’ (Socialist Legal Theory and Sociology) (2004) 4 
Világosság 65–77.
H. Szilágyi, István, ‘Dráma és jogfilozófia Horváth Barna életművében’ (Drama and Legal Philosophy 
in the Oeuvre of Barna Horváth) in Loss, Sándor et al.: Portrévázlatok a magyar jogbölcseleti 
gondolkodás történetéből (Bíbor, 1995) 211–66.
H. Szilágyi, István, ‘Let Us Invent the Hungarian Legal Anthropology’ (2002) 33 Rechtstheorie 187–
96.
H. Szilágyi, István, ‘A marxista társadalomtudományi fogalmak használhatatlansága’ (2003) 4 
Jogelméleti Szemle <http://jesz.ajk.elte.hu/hszilagyi16.html> accessed 23 October 2017
H. Szilágyi, István, ‘A marxista társadalomtudományi fogalmak használhatatlansága’ (2004) 4 
Világosság 79–88.
H. Szilágyi, István, ‘A jog lélektani alapjai’ (Psychological Bases of Law) in H. Szilágyi, István, (ed.), 
Társadalmi jogi kutatások. Egyetemi jegyzet (Szent István Társulat 2012) 102–16.
Hanák, Tibor, Az elmaradt reneszánsz, 1–2. A marxista filozófia Magyarországon – Történelmi 
áttekintés/Rendszeres áttekintés (The Cancelled Renaissance, 1–2. Marxist Philosophy in 
Hungary. A Historical and Conceptual Overview) (Európai Protestáns Magyar Szabadegyetem 
1979).
Horváth, Barna, A közvélemény ellenőrzése (The Control of Public Opinion) (Magyar Királyi Ferencz 
József Tudományegyetem 1939).
Horváth, Barna, A közvélemény vizsgálata. Die Unterschung der öffentlichen Meinung. The 
examination of public opinion (Univ, Nagy Jenő 1942).
Horváth, Barna, ‘A láthatatlan ember’ (The Invisible Man) (1942) 6 Délvidéki Szemle 226–33.
Horváth, Barna, ‘A közvélemény megszólaltatása’ (Giving Voice to the Public Opinion) (1946) 
Közvélemény. A Magyar Közvéleménykutató Intézet Szemléje 3–5.
Horváth, Tibor, ‘Jogismeret és büntetőjog’ (Knowledge about Law and Penal Law) (1975) 12 Állam- 
és Jogtudomány 405–28.
357KNOWLEDGE AND OPINION ABOUT LAW (KOL) RESEARCH IN SOCIALIST HUNGARY
Korinek, László, A látens bűnözés vizsgálata (Study of Latency in Criminality) (1984) [unpublished 
doctoral thesis (candidature)].
Korinek, László, ‘A magyar népesség viktimizációjának néhány aspektusa’ (Some Aspect of 
Victimization of the Hungarian Population) (1985) 40 Jogtudományi Közlöny 10–14.
Korinek, László, ‘Victimization, attitudes towards crime and related issues. Comparative Research 
Results from Hungary’ in Arnold, Harald (ed.), Victims and Criminal Justice (Max-Planck 
Institute 1991) 45–99.
Kulcsár, Kálmán. A jogszociológia problémái (Problems of Legal Sociology) (KJK 1960).
Kulcsár, Kálmán, ‘Matematikai módszerek a jogtudományban’ (Mathematical Methods in Legal 
Studies) (1962) 5 Állam- és Jogtudomány 568–78.
Kulcsár, Kálmán, ‘A jog és a szociológia’ (Law and Sociology) (1964) 7 Állam- és Jogtudomány 
635–42.
Kulcsár, Kálmán, A jogismeret vizsgálata (Study of the Peoples’ Knowledge about Law) (MTA-JTI 
1967).
Kulcsár Kálmán, Társadalom, gazdaság, jog (Society, Economy, Law) (Közgazdasági és Jogi 
Könyvkiadó 1982).
Kulcsár Kálmán, A modernizáció és a magyar társadalom (Modernization and the Hungarian Society) 
(Magvető 1986).
Kulcsár Kálmán, A modernizáció és a jog (Modernization and Law) (Közgazdasági és Jogi 
Könyvkiadó 1989).
Kutchinsky, Berl, ‘Law and Education: Some Aspects of Scandinavia Studies into the »general Sense 
of Justice«’ (1966) 10 Acta Sociologica 21–41.
Léderer, Pál and Sajó, András, Kutatási összefoglaló a jogi szocializáció vizsgálatról (Research 
Report on the Study of Legal Socialization) (1984) [manuscript].
Neményi, Mária and Sajó, András, ‘Levelek a TV „Jogi esetek” c. műsorához’ (Letters to the TV 
Program “Legal Cases”) (1984) 27 Állam- és Jogtudomány 208–44.
Oakeshott, Michael, Lectures in the History of Political Thought (Imprint Academic, 2006).
Podgórecki, Adam et al., Knowledge and Opinion about Law (Martin Robertson 1973).
Sajó, András, ‘Miért nem természetjogász Thomas Hobbes’ (Why cannot Hobbes be regarded as a 
Natural Law Thinker?) (1974) 17 Állam- és jogtudomány 101–20.
Sajó András, ‘A szuverén és az alattvaló helyzete Thomas Hobbes felfogásában’ (The Position of 
Sovereign and Subjects in the Conception of Thomas Hobbes) (1974) 17 Állam- és jogtudomány 
480–501.
Sajó András, ‘Az engedelmesség és korlátai’ (Obeisance and its Limits) (1975) 18 Állam- és 
jogtudomány 159–89.
Sajó András, ‘Empirikus elővizsgálatok a jogtudatról’ (Preparatory Studies on Legal Consciousness) 
(1975) 18 Állam- és Jogtudomány 464–74.
Sajó András, ‘Jogi nézetek az egyéni tudatban’ (Legal Ideas in the Individual Consciousness) (1976) 
19 Állam- és Jogtudomány 419–43.
Sajó, András, Székelyi, Mária and Major, Péter, Vizsgálat a fizikai dolgozók jogtudatáról (A Study on 
the Legal Consciousness of Blue-Collar Workers) (MTA ÁJTI 1977).
Sajó, András, Jogkövetés és társadalmi magatartás (Obedience to Law and Social Behaviour) 
(Akadémiai Kiadó 1980).
Sajó, András, ‘A jogi nézetek rendszere a gazdasági vezetők jogtudatában’ (Legal Ideas in the Mind of 
Socialist CEOs) (1981) 24 Állam- és Jogtudomány 608–38.
Sajó, András, A jogtudat mikrokörnyezeti meghatározói (MTA ÁJTI 1981).
Sajó, András, Látszat és valóság a jogban (Illusion and Reality in Law) (Közgazdasági és Jogi 
Könyvkiadó 1986).
Sajó, András, Társadalmi-jogi változás (Socio-Legal Change) (Akadémiai Kiadó 1988).
Sajó, András, A jogosultság-tudat vizsgálata (A Study of the Rights Consciousness) (ELTE 
Szociológiai Intézet 1988–1989).
Sajó András, Constitutional Sentiments (Yale University Press 2011).
Samu, Mihály, ‘Szocialista jogszemléletünk fejlődése’ (The Development of Our Socialist 
Understanding of Law) (1975) 22 Magyar Jog 135–42.
358 BALÁZS FEKETE, ISTVÁN H. SZILÁGYI
Schelsky, Helmut, ‘A jogszociológia antropológiai és perszonális-funkcionális megközelítése’ 
(An Anthropological and Personal-Functional Approach of Sociology of the Law) in Sajó András 
(ed.): Jog és szociológia (Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó 1979) 155–70.
Studnicki, Franciszek, ‘A jogszabályok kommunikációs problémái’ (The Problems of Communicating 
Laws) (1965) 40 Studia iuridica auctoritate Universitatis Pécs publicata 23–37.
Szabadfalvi, József, ‘Törekvés egy jogfilozófiai szintézisre. Moór Gyula jogbölcselete’ (Effort for a 
Synthesis in Legal Philosophy. The Legal Philosphy of Gyula Moór) in Loss Sándor et al.: 
Portrévázlatok a magyar jogbölcseleti gondolkodás történetéből (Bíbor, 1995) 143–209.
Szabadfalvi, József, ‘Viszony az elődökhöz. A marxista jogelmélet reflexiói a két világháború közötti 
magyar jogbölcseleti gondolkodásról’ (A Relationship to the Predecessors. The Reflections of the 
Marxist Legal Theory on the Legal Philosophy of the Interwar Period) in Szabadfalvi József, 
A cselevőségi elmélettől az újrealizmusig (From the Theory of Actions to the New Realism) 
(Gondolat–DE ÁJK 2004) 217–37.
Szabadfalvi, József, ‘Revaluation of Hungarian Legal Philosophical Tradition’ (2003) 89 Archiv für 
Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 159–70.
Szabó, Imre, ‘A jogbölcselet problémái. (Moór Gyula tanulmánya)’ (Problems of Legal Philosphy 
[A Piece of Gyula Moór]) (1946) 1–2 Jogtudományi Közlöny 39–40.
Szabó, Imre, A burzsoá állam- és jogbölcselet Magyarországon (Bourgeois State- and Legal 
Philosophy in Hungary) (Akadémiai 1955).
Szabó, Imre, ‘A jogtudat’ (Legal Consciousness) in Szabó Imre, A jogelmélet alapjai (Akadémiai 
Kiadó 1971) 195–295.
Szabó, Miklós, ‘Defensor dogmatis‘ (2004) 4 Világosság 35–48.
Szilágyi, Péter, ‘Szabó Imre szocialista normativizmusa. Adalékok a szocialista normativizmus 
ideológiakirtikájához’ (Imre Szabó’s Socialist Normativism. Appendix to the Criticism of Socialist 
Normativism) (2003) 4 Jogelméleti Szemle < http://jesz.ajk.elte.hu/szilagyi16.html> accessed 23 
October 2017
Szilágyi, Péter, ‘Szabó Imre szocialista normativizmusa’ (Imre Szabó’s Socialist Normativism) (2004) 
4 Világosság 23–33.
Tamás, András, ‘A jogtudat meghatározása, gyakorlati vonatkozások’ (The Definition of Legal 
Consciousness, Practical Dimensions) (1969) 24 Jogtudományi Közlöny 15–24.
Tárkány-Szűcs, Ernő, ‘Magyar jogi népszokások’ (Hungarian Legal Folk Customs) (Gondolat 1981).
Tomasic, Roman, The Sociology of Law (Sage 1987).
Tóth, Eszter Zsófia, Kádár leányai. Nők a szocialista időszakban (Nyitott Könyvműhely 2010).
Varga, Csaba, ‘A szocializmus marxizmusának jogelmélete. Hazai körkép nemzetközi kitekintésben’ 
(The Legal Theory of Socialist Marxism. Domestic Overview in an International Context) (2004) 
4 Világosság 89–116.
Varga, Csaba, ‘Barna Horváth’ in Horváth Barna, The Bases of Law/A jog alapjai (Szent István 
Társulat 2006) XVII–XVIII.
Varga, Csaba, ‘Egy jogtudós útkeresése. Kulcsár Kálmán emlékezése Egerről, katonai ügyész 
pályakezdéséről, az akadémia jogtudomány-művelésben révbe érkezéséről’ (The Way before a 
Legal Scholar. Memories of Kálmán Kulcsár on Eger, His start as a Military Prosecutor and the 
Arrival to the Academic Sphere of Legal Studies) (2013) 3 Jogelméleti Szemle 167–204.
Visegrády, Antal and Mária, Schadt, ‘A pécsi joghallgatók jogtudatának néhány vonása’ (Some 
Features of the Legal Consciousness of Law Students from Pécs) (1985) 34 Felsőoktatási Szemle 
735–44.
Vígh, József and Tauber, István, ‘A bűnözés megelőzése és a jogtudat egyes problémái’ (Crime 
Prevention and Certain Problems of Legal Consciousness) in Szűk László (ed.), A bűnmegelőzésről 
1. Tanulmánykötet (Igazságügyi Minisztérium 1983) 64–111.
